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1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Rent-seeking is omnipresent. Across different domains of economic and social activities, 
people compete against each other to obtain a favorable position that brings certain monetary or 
non-monetary advantages. However, these advantages are not generated in the course of 
competition, but are rather induced by the re-allocation of resources already present in the 
economic system. This means costly efforts of rent-seeking activities are economically not 
productive from a societal perspective.  
Rent-seeking is not only often observed in markets (e.g., advertising campaigns), but also 
in politics (e.g., electoral campaigns, lobbying), in law practice (e.g., litigation) and in sports 
(see Szymanski 2003 for an extensive overview). Not all rent-seeking is legal (e.g., bribing and 
vote buying).  
Moreover, rent-seeking competition has become more and more frequent in modern 
economies. It is often organized in forms of ‘beauty contests’. In beauty contests, an organizer 
invites proposals that are costly to prepare for participants. In many industries, such as 
consulting, construction or architectural design, such procedures have become common. 
Similarly, in many prestigious sporting events, like the Olympic Games and the Soccer World 
Cup, the host is chosen through a beauty contest between cities or countries. 
The social costs of rent-seeking are difficult to estimate. Scarce empirical literature is 
often based on only fragmentary data. Still, present analyses confirm that rent-seeking activities 
can be very costly (Angelopoulos et al. 2009) and can hamper economic growth (Murphy et al. 
1993). One can argue that resources spent on rent-seeking activities are not necessarily wasted, 
per se – it is possible that they create new jobs, which may have some positive economic 
consequences. Still, it is very likely that this is not the most efficient way to spend resources. 
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Finally, rent-seeking produces inefficiencies in modern job markets. We live in “winner-
take-all” societies (Frank and Cook 1995), in which many job markets are characterized by the 
following remuneration structure: A relatively small number of top performers are paid very well 
and get additional non-monetary benefits, such as fame or prestige. A large proportion of 
mediocre-performers are, however, paid poorly and work under precarious conditions. In such 
markets, a promise of big success attracts a lot of young, talented people who decide to receive 
an education in a certain domain. Since many of them are deemed to fail, they often end up in 
jobs below their qualifications and potential. Entertainment (film industry in particular), sports 
and the arts are the traditional examples of such job markets. A closer look at the higher education 
and research industries reveals that we face a very similar structure of incentives and a similar 
disparity between top-performers and almost top-performers in academia. This inefficiency of 
the misallocation of talents (Frank and Cook 1995, pp. 9-10) may be even more tremendous than 
the one described earlier. However, it is extremely difficult to estimate the magnitude of the 
phenomenon and the monetary consequences of wasted talents and skills.  
 
1.1. The economic research on rent-seeking  
Given how common, costly and inefficient rent-seeking behavior can be, there is no doubt 
that the topic deserves economists’ attention and it is not surprising that it has been studied in 
economics for about fifty years now. Economic research on rent-seeking was pioneered by 
Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974) and Posner (1975). Tullock (1967) was the first who recognized 
that the endogeneity of political decisions on creating monopolies and tariffs increases social 
costs of such regulations beyond the Harberger’s triangle because some resources are wasted in 
the contest between economic actors aiming at becoming the monopolist. Moreover, it became 
rapidly clear that similar situations are frequent in economic and social interactions and that the 
concept of rent-seeking has a much broader application than the context of striving for a 
monopolistic position (Congleton et al. 2008b, p. 1).  
Economic research on rent-seeking behavior has been accelerated by the seminal work 
of Tullock (1980), who provided a simple analytical framework of rent-seeking contests.1 First, 
it reflects a realistic assumption that the winner in such settings is selected by a combination of 
                                                          
1 Note that the Tullock (1980) contest is used not only in rent-seeking settings. However, it is its most important 
application. Therefore, it is common to use the terms “Tullock contests” and “rent-seeking contests” 
interchangeably. So do I in this thesis. 
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merit and luck. Second, its analytical simplicity is a great asset that allows for a tractable game-
theoretic analysis and numerous theoretical extensions. Tullock’s (1980) framework provides 
researchers with neat and clear game-theoretic predictions. In most cases, a Tullock contest is 
characterized by a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (Perez-Castrillo and Verdier 1992; 
Szidarovsky and Okuguchi 1997). 
Empirical investigations of rent-seeking are hampered by the difficulty of obtaining 
reliable data. In many contexts mentioned above, no data is available to research, particularly 
due to its nontransparent nature – e.g., in lobbying, litigation or bribing. This is why economic 
experiments offered an appealing way of providing empirical data. The first experiments on rent-
seeking were conducted in late 1980s (Millner and Pratt 1989, 1991). Since then, rent-seeking 
behavior has been studied in economic laboratories across the world. This led to extensive 
experimental literature on the topic (see recent surveys by Dechenaux et al. 2015 and Sheremeta 
2013). Even though economic experiments have substantially advanced economists’ 
understanding of rent-seeking, several robust results from the laboratories remain puzzling. 
Overbidding (i.e., subjects invest significantly more than the Nash equilibrium predicts) and 
overspreading (i.e., subjects frequently use almost the entire strategy space) have gained the 
most attention (Sheremeta 2013, 2014). 
 
1.2. The scope of the thesis and its findings 
This thesis consists of five studies on rent-seeking and contributes to the behavioral and 
experimental analyses of this phenomenon. Using experimental methods and insights from 
behavioral economics, I test theoretic predictions of standard economics for rent-seeking settings 
and complement standard models by behavioral extensions.  
Chapter 2 (Beliefs and Behavior in Tullock Contests) is joint work with Bettina 
Rockenbach and is the first systematic analysis of beliefs and behaviors in experimental Tullock 
contests. In a series of experiments, we investigate how subjects build their beliefs in repeated 
contests, and, more importantly, how they respond to beliefs. We enrich the standard 
experimental design with the procedure of incentivized belief elicitation. This allows us to test 
the theoretical prediction in new dimensions. Our experimental data provides clean evidence for 
myopic belief formation and thus yields a strong justification for a common assumption in 
contest models. Moreover, we investigate how subjects respond to expected off-equilibrium 
strategies of the competitor. We find that best-responding is rare in general. Instead, subjects 
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tend to match their belief with their own investment. This leads to a linear response function, 
which substantially differs from the game-theoretic prediction, and causes the well-documented 
phenomenon of overbidding. We consider several possible explanations for the revealed 
behavioral regularities. We show that neither limited computational abilities, nor random 
mistakes, nor inequity aversion drive the pattern. An analysis of behavior in asymmetric contests 
brings us to the conclusion that the desire to win is a dominant motive for “matching-behavior”.  
Chapter 3 (On the Reluctance to Play Best Responses in Tullock Contests) is joint work 
with Bettina Rockenbach. We investigate the effect of the matching protocol in repeated 
experimental contests on investment behavior. We test whether the rarity of best responses in 
Tullock contests is due to the inter-temporal dynamics between partners in repeated contests. 
Since subjects’ computational limitations might impair the implementation of intended 
strategies, we also manipulate across treatments the saliency of best responses. We find that the 
matching protocol itself has no effect on the willingness to best-respond. This holds irrespective 
of whether best responses are made very salient to subjects or not. On the other hand, providing 
direct hints at best responses increases their occurrence, albeit to only about 20 percent. 
Chapter 4 (Pushing the Bad Away: Reverse Tullock Contests), joint work with Bettina 
Rockenbach, is a study on behavior in reverse Tullock contests. While most research considers 
rent-seeking for achieving gains, we recognize that contests are often conducted for avoiding 
losses. We show that the equilibrium prediction under standard preferences is robust against such 
a variation. However, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) suggests that contests 
involving negative prizes may be fiercer than traditional contests with positive prizes. We test 
this hypothesis in a new experiment. We find that average investments in reverse contests are 
higher by 15 percent than in conventional contests. However, the effect is statistically not 
significant. 
Chapter 5 (Heterogeneous Effect of Group Identity in Collective Rent-Seeking) 
investigates collective rent-seeking, in which groups instead of individuals compete against each 
other for a prize that is a public good for the winning team. The equilibrium analysis predicts 
that teams in such competition invest as much as individual players. However, Abbink et al. 
(2010) show that investments in collective contests are much higher than in individual contests. 
Moreover, the authors find that within groups, large differences in contributions are very 
persistent. In a new experiment, I replicate Abbink et al.’s results regarding both overbidding 
and behavioral heterogeneity. I explain the large and persistent within-group heterogeneity in 
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behavior with the heterogeneous effect of group identity. Subjects identify themselves with their 
teams to very different extents. Those who report a strong attachment to their groups keep 
investing much, even though their team mates who do not report any attachment to the team 
consequently free-ride. This shows that group identity is an important driver of contest behavior. 
Moreover, it demonstrates that group identity may have detrimental consequences in rent-
seeking settings, as it boosts efforts of a wasteful nature.  
Chapter 6 (Envy in Dynamic Contests), which is joint work with Uta K. Schier, is a 
theoretical and experimental study on the role of envy in dynamic contests. First, we conduct a 
game-theoretic analysis of a set-up with two battles, in which only the winner of both battles is 
awarded a prize. A tie in wins (1:1) leads to the prize not being awarded. We demonstrate that 
the equilibrium predictions under standard preferences, does not hold for subjects that dislike 
lagging behind; that is, subjects who are inequity averse. We show theoretically that envious 
losers of the first battle do not give up in the second battle and try to prevent the competitor from 
winning the prize. We test the theoretical prediction in a laboratory experiment and find clear 
evidence for envy-driven behavior. We observe that the first-battle-losers frequently do not give 
up in the second battle. As a consequence, in 30 percent of the cases the prize is not awarded to 
any contestant. This suggests potential for large inefficiencies.  
 
1.3. Scientific relevance and contribution of the thesis 
This thesis provides new results and insights on rent-seeking behavior relevant from both 
(economic) methodological and political perspectives. Therewith it advances the economic 
analysis of rent-seeking in two important dimensions. 
From the methodological point of view, it contributes to a better understanding of 
behavior in experimental contests. A profound understanding of motives, decision-processes and 
goals in the lab is crucial for researchers to be able to interpret observed behavior correctly. The 
thesis answers several questions important for researchers designing experiments on contest 
behavior, for example: To what extent is the matching protocol important in repeated Tullock 
contests? Is the assumption of myopic beliefs in repeated contests justified? Does a 
computational tool help solve the problem of not following best responses? These insights might 
be useful for future experimental studies on rent-seeking, given the increasing interest in 
experimental evidence on contest behavior. 
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From a policy perspective, the studies presented in this thesis help understand what drives 
competitive behavior in rent-seeking situations and, therefore, offer several implications for 
policy-makers designing contests. They provide at least partial answers to such questions as: 
Why are tie-rules in dynamic contests important and should be chosen carefully? How large is 
the danger of collusion in rent-seeking contests? Are the contests organized to avoid bad 
outcomes different from contests organized to obtain a gain? Why can team contests between 
groups with a strong common identity be dangerous? Moreover, I consider not only conventional 
(i.e., individual and static) contests but also richer and more complex settings. Therefore, the 
findings presented in the thesis better reflect frequent examples of dynamic contests and contests 
between groups. 
Chapters 2 contributes to a vivid discussion in the recent literature on the reasons for 
overbidding in experimental contests – the research question that has dominated the experimental 
investigation of rent-seeking in the last years. Bettina Rockenbach and I demonstrate the crucial 
role of beliefs in explaining overbidding. Anticipation of opponents’ aggressive behavior drives 
higher investments that ends up in well-documented overbidding. This result can be important 
for both researchers designing contests in the lab and policy-makers.  
The data collected in the lab expands the research beyond theoretical considerations and 
proves that the standard game-theoretic analysis based on the homo oeconomicus paradigm 
requires behavioral supplements. On the one hand, I show that standard assumptions are not met: 
Subjects’ rationality is bounded, they face difficulties with computing best responses, and they 
are inequity averse. On the other hand, standard analysis misses important non-monetary 
incentives, such as loss aversion, joy of winning, and group identity.  
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Chapter 2: 
BELIEFS AND BEHAVIOR IN 
TULLOCK CONTESTS 
 
Joint work with Bettina Rockenbach 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Rent-seeking is frequent in politics, markets, sports, education, or in research.1 
It causes tremendous monetary and non-monetary costs and often leads to inefficiencies 
in resource allocations (e.g., Murphy et al. 1993, Stewart and Wu 1997, Angelopoulos 
et al. 2009). Tullock (1980) proposed a simple model of rent-seeking behavior that has 
become a standard analytical framework in economic research on contests.2,3 Since 
observational field data on rent-seeking behavior are only rarely available, economists 
have turned to experimental methods to obtain controlled empirical evidence on rent-
seeking behavior, extending the research beyond the theoretic considerations and 
models. More than 25 years of experimental investigation of rent-seeking (pioneered by 
Millner and Pratt 1989, 1991) has led to an extensive body of literature on experimental 
contests (see Dechenaux et al. 2015 for a comprehensive overview). In the face of a large 
number of studies, it is striking that some very robust phenomena of contest behavior 
observed in laboratories remain unexplained. The main, well-reported (and yet not fully 
                                                          
1 Konrad (2009) discusses a wide range of applications in more detail. 
2 Earlier on, Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974) already discussed economic consequences of rent-
seeking. 
3 Throughout the paper, the term “contest” refers to Tullock contests. For differences between Tullock 
contests and other canonical models (tournaments or all-pay auctions), see Dechenaux et al. (2015). 
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understood) phenomenon is overbidding: Subjects invest systematically more than 
predicted by the theoretic equilibrium analysis (Sheremeta 2013). Researchers have been 
exploring several mechanisms that possibly drive this result. Among these, bounded 
rationality, utility of winning, other-regarding preferences, or probability distortions 
belong to the most widely considered. Yet in his survey Sheremeta (2013, p. 508) 
concludes that “it remains an open question as to whether some of these factors are 
correlated as if so, which are the most important ones.” 
In this chapter we advance our understanding of contestants’ overbidding by 
providing the first study systematically focusing on contestants’ beliefs about 
competitors’ behavior and their responses to these beliefs. In a series of laboratory 
experiments on contest behavior with incentivized belief elicitation, we vary the salience 
of best-response behavior as well as the presence (and degree) of investment cost 
asymmetry between players.4  
Our findings are extremely clear. With regard to belief formation, we provide 
strong evidence that contestants hold myopic (Cournot) beliefs, i.e., they expect the 
opponent to invest as much as in the previous period. This pattern has been an implicit 
or explicit assumption in several previous studies, e.g., Fallucchi et al. (2013), Lim et al. 
(2014), however, so far without any experimental support. Our main result, however, 
concerns behavioral responses to beliefs. In symmetric contests, we find that subjects 
predominantly invest as much as they believe the competitor does. This leads to 
systematic overbidding. We show that this is not an effect of limited computational 
abilities, as belief matching still prevails when subjects are equipped with a best-reply 
calculator. We can also exclude inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) in realized 
or in expected payoffs as an explanation for the observed behavior. Additionally, we 
show that (almost) linear response functions cannot be captured with statistical models 
involving noise, e.g., quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, Goeree 
et al. 2005). Finally, with a systematic analysis of contests with asymmetric investment 
costs, we show that belief matching is not driven by striving for equality in winning 
probabilities, but instead is in line with the desire to win. With an increasing cost 
                                                          
4 A very recent study by Sheremeta (2015a) also employs incentivized belief elicitation. However, both 
the belief elicitation procedure and the focus of the paper are different from ours. We became aware of 
Sheremeta’s study when completing our paper. Moreover, Herrmann and Orzen (2008) utilize the strategy 
method (Selten 1967) in experimental contests, which, however, is a substantially different approach from 
the direct response method in our experiment. See also discussion in Section 2.4.  
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asymmetry, low-cost players more and more heavily exploit their advantageous position 
by bidding excessively more than needed to achieve equal winning probabilities, 
whereas high cost players are more likely to surrender.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present 
our research agenda. Section 2.3 describes our experimental game and design. In Section 
2.4, we report our results on elicited beliefs and behavioral responses to beliefs. In 
Section 2.5, we study the impact of the bounded computational abilities in experimental 
contests, and in section 2.6, we explore behavior in asymmetric contests. Section 2.7 
concludes. 
 
2.2. Our research agenda 
Scholars have investigated several reasons for overbidding. In general, one can 
classify the examined explanations into those modifying subjects’ preferences and those 
allowing for subjects to make mistakes. Among the first category, social preferences 
(e.g., Herrmann and Orzen 2008), joy of winning (e.g., Sheremeta 2010) and 
evolutionary preferences (e.g., Hehenkamp et al. 2004) are most common. However, 
much attention is also devoted to the hypothesis that subjects make mistakes (see e.g., 
Potters et al. 1998). Sheremeta (2011) applies the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) 
approach (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995) to fit the data from experimental contests and 
finds patterns in line with predictions of the QRE. Similarly, Lim et al. (2014) apply 
logit quantal responses to fit behavior in contest games with different numbers of 
players. The authors report that the average expenditure level does not depend on the 
group size. However, the expenditures are more dispersed in large groups. Lim et al. 
link their descriptive observations to parameter estimates of the QRE-model and 
conclude that for larger groups the parameters depart further from perfect rationality. 
Our research agenda is closely related to the stream of literature striving to 
explain overbidding in experimental contests. We provide new insights into rent-seeking 
behavior by investigating how subjects form their beliefs about the competitors’ 
behavior and how subjects respond to these beliefs. We can organize our research agenda 
into three steps. In the first step, we extend the standard Tullock contest to include belief 
elicitation. Two contestants, endowed with E tokens each, may buy tickets at a cost of 1 
for a lottery with a winning prize of V. A contestant’s winning probability equals the 
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number of one’s own tickets bought as a fraction of the total number of tickets bought 
by both contestants. In our experimental sessions, the same two contestants interact 
repeatedly over 20 periods. Our BASELINE treatment extends this standard design 
through incentivized belief elicitation: Contestants are asked to guess the other 
contestant’s investment and earn more money when their guess is more accurate. We 
find that subjects predominantly hold myopic (Cournot) beliefs: They expect the 
opponent to invest as much as in the previous period. The main finding, however, lies 
in the pattern of responses to beliefs: Subjects predominantly invest the amount they 
believe their competitor invests. A linear reaction function is in stark contrast to the 
theoretic best-response function and results in overbidding (see Section 2.4).  
In the second step (treatment C1), we investigate whether belief matching is 
caused by computational limitations. We modify our BASELINE treatment by providing 
subjects with a computational tool, which allows for unambiguously identifying best 
responses (see Section 2.5). Yet we observe no difference in behavior as compared to 
the BASELINE, either in the average investment levels or in the reaction functions. Thus, 
we can exclude limited computational abilities as a cause for belief-matching 
investments. We can also exclude that observed behavior is driven by inequity aversion 
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999) in realized or in expected payoffs, both in BASELINE and in C1.    
In the third step of our agenda, we introduce investment cost asymmetry between 
contestants to investigate whether matching investments on beliefs is driven by striving 
for equality in investments or for equality in winning probabilities. While in treatment 
C1 both contestants receive 1 ticket per token invested, the asymmetric treatments 
feature a low-cost and a high-cost player. The low-cost player receives 3 (in treatment 
C1.5), 2 (in treatment C2) and 4 (in treatment C4) tickets per token, while the high-cost 
player receives 1 ticket per token invested in C2 and C4 and 2 tickets per token in 
treatment C1.5. Thus, we vary the level of asymmetry, from relatively low to high. We 
find that in the asymmetric contests low-cost players exploit their advantageous position 
by investing even more than they expect from the opponent, resulting in very high 
winning probabilities. In contrast, as cost asymmetry increases, high-cost players are 
more likely to give in and not participate in the contest (see Section 2.6).  
Table 2.1 presents an overview of our experimental treatments and their main 
characteristics. In Section 2.3, we describe our experimental design in more detail. 
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Table 2.1: Overview over the experimental treatments. 
Treat-
ment 
No. of 
subjects 
(indep. 
observ.) 
Belief 
elicit. 
Computa-
tional tool 
Investment costs 
BASE-
LINE 
58 (29) Yes No 
Symmetry: Both players receive 1 
ticket per token 
C1 56 (28) Yes Yes 
Symmetry: Both players receive 1 
ticket per token 
C1.5 58 (29) Yes Yes 
Low Asymmetry: 
Low-cost player receives 3 tickets and 
high-cost player receives 2 tickets per 
token 
C2 60 (30) Yes Yes 
Medium Asymmetry: 
Low-cost player receives 2 tickets and 
high-cost player receives 1 ticket per 
token 
C4 60 (30) Yes Yes 
High Asymmetry: 
Low-cost player receives 4 tickets and 
high-cost player receives 1 ticket per 
token 
 
2.3. Experimental game, design and procedure  
2.3.1. Experimental game 
We design a laboratory environment that employs a two-player rent-seeking 
contest (Tullock 1980) for a monetary prize V. Assume that both contestants  and  
have an endowment E and simultaneously invest in “lottery tickets” for the contest. For 
each unit invested, contestant  receives  lottery tickets5,  = 1, 2. If  invests  and 
the competitor  invests , player   wins the contest with probability:  
 =  +  (2.1) 
and has a payoff of: 
 =     =  = 0 −     −  +      (2.2) 
 
                                                          
5 Kimbrough et al. (2014, p. 98) refer to the different investment costs as the “conflict strengths.” 
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Player ’s best reply against contestant ’s investment  is: 
 =  −   (2.3)  
The unique equilibrium is symmetric with investments:  
∗ = ∗ = ( + ) (2.4) 
Therefore, in the symmetric cost case ( =   > 0), the unique Nash equilibrium under 
money-maximizing preferences is that both players invest one quarter of the prize, i.e., /4 (Szidarovsky and Okuguchi 1997).  
 
2.3.2. Experimental implementation 
In the experiment, we frame the game as a lottery. We choose an endowment of 
E=20 and a prize of V=20. Hence, in case of symmetric costs, in equilibrium both 
contestants invest 5. In addition to the decision on the investment in the lottery, subjects 
also have to guess what they expect the competitor to invest. We incentivize belief 
elicitation using a quadratic loss function.6 Subjects can earn a bonus of up to 4 tokens 
in every round for their beliefs. The beliefs are rewarded according the following bonus 
function:  Bonus = max-0;  4 − 0.4(Belief − Actual investment)8.  (2.5) 
 
Thereafter, subjects receive feedback about their own and their competitor’s 
decisions, and the resulting probabilities of winning are provided in numbers and 
represented graphically (as lengths of a segment) on the screen.7 All bought tickets are 
numerated and subjects are informed which numbers correspond to their lottery tickets. 
If no contestant buys any tickets, the lottery is not conducted and nobody wins the prize. 
Otherwise, the computer randomly draws one of the purchased tickets. The ticket holder 
wins the lottery and receives the prize. Both contestants are informed about the winner 
of the lottery and their payoff. 
                                                          
6 For the advantages of the quadratic rules as compared to the linear ones, see e.g., Selten (1998) and 
Palfrey and Wang (2009). We are aware that there is no agreement in economic experimental methodology 
on whether to incentivize beliefs or not (see for example the recent survey by Schlag et al. 2015). 
7 For translation of experimental instructions, see appendix C. 
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Thus, the expected payoff (without a bonus for belief reports) of player  with 
an investment of  and a competitor’s investment of  is given by: 
Π = 20 −  +  +  20 (2.6) 
In the experiment, the stage game is repeated for 20 periods in partner matching.8 
Every period has the same timing and is payoff-relevant. The experimental tokens are 
exchanged into Euros at the rate 45 tokens=1 Euro. 
 
2.3.3. Experimental procedure 
We conducted the experiment in the spring and fall 2015 in the Cologne 
Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER), Germany. The participants were students 
with various majors and were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2015). In total, 292 students 
(59% female) participated in ten experimental sessions split equally between five 
treatments (see Table 2.1).9 Each subject participated only in one treatment. Depending 
on the treatment, experimental sessions lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. On average, 
subjects earned 14.20 EUR. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).  
 
2.4. Beliefs and behavioral responses 
Figure 2.1 shows the results from our BASELINE treatment (with  =  = 1). 
Average investments are 6.48, significantly more than the equilibrium investment of 5 
(p=0.013).10,11 The average magnitude of overbidding (29.7%) is comparable to the 
results from the meta-analysis by Sheremeta (2013). Another robust finding about 
                                                          
8 The horizon of the game is standard; most previous experiments applied between 10 and 30 periods. 
Moreover, in the previous research, both partner and stranger matching have been frequently used (see 
e.g., Table 1 in Fallucchi et al. 2013 for an overview). 
9 We strived for 60 participants in each treatment (i.e., 300 in total). A lower number of subjects in some 
treatments is due to several no-shows. 
10 In all reported tests, we consider a pair of players over 20 periods as one independent observation.  
11 Throughout the paper, whenever we report significance levels in tests for differences, we refer to results 
from a non-parametric two-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test (with 200,000 runs). Depending on the 
nature of the data, we apply a version for either independent samples or paired replications. Unlike the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (which is the most common alternative to the Fisher-Pitman test), the Fisher-
Pitman test does not draw any conclusion about the underlying population. Therefore, it does not depend 
on assumptions about the population (e.g., subjects being randomly drawn and symmetric around the 
median). Moreover, the Wilcoxon test is based on ranks and therefore ignores a substantial part of the 
information in the sample data. The Pitman-Fisher permutation test uses the more powerful approach 
based on the original sample values without transformation (see Kaiser 2007; Selten et al. 2011). Unless 
explicitly noted, all usual significance thresholds hold also under the parametric test (t-test). 
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contest behavior is overspreading: Subjects not only invest “close” to the equilibrium 
prediction of 5 but also use the entire strategy space. This is also the case in our data 
(see Figure 2.10 in appendix A). 
 Figure 2.1: Average investments and beliefs (BASELINE treatment). 
 
 
Result 2.1: In our BASELINE treatment, contestants’ investments are in line with previous 
research and significantly higher than predicted in equilibrium. 
 
2.4.1. Accuracy of beliefs 
More than three quarters (77.9%) of the reported beliefs were rewarded with a 
positive bonus, which means that the absolute inaccuracy was not larger than 3 tokens. 
More than one third (36.7%) of beliefs exactly matched the competitor’s behavior. 
Figure 2.2 (panel A) depicts the distribution of belief inaccuracy. Over time, 
subjects increase their performance in predicting competitor’s behavior. The average 
inaccuracy is 3.13 in the initial five periods of the experiment and 1.81 in final five 
periods. The difference is highly significant (p<0.01). 
 
2.4.2. Myopic beliefs 
Several previous experimental studies on contest behavior analyze observed 
behavior under the assumption of myopic beliefs (e.g., Fallucchi et al. 2013, Lim et al. 
2014). Our data allows us to identify to what extent this assumption is justified. We find 
clear evidence for myopic beliefs under partner matching. Figure 2.2 (panel B) shows 
that 44.2 percent of beliefs are perfectly myopic. In 68.9 percent of cases the difference 
between the reported belief and the myopic belief is not larger than 1. Moreover, the 
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distribution of deviations from the myopic beliefs is symmetric. We can summarize this 
as:  
Result 2.2: Subjects’ beliefs are highly accurate. They predominantly hold myopic 
beliefs or beliefs very close to myopic. 
 
Figure 2.2: Beliefs in BASELINE treatment. 
 
2.4.3. Behavioral response to beliefs 
In the next step, we study how subjects behave when holding certain beliefs. We 
compare the theoretic prediction with the behavioral responses to beliefs observed in our 
experiment. Figure 2.3 depicts the average investments for a given belief about 
competitor’s behavior and contrasts them with the theoretic prediction. Moreover, we 
plot the frequencies of reported beliefs.  
The difference between the theoretic prediction and observed behavior is 
remarkable. Subjects substantially deviate from playing best responses. Instead, their 
behavior can be described with a linear reaction function. Subjects tend to invest as much 
as they expect from the competitor, which means that they match their investments with 
their beliefs. Whereas such behavior is justified in the symmetric equilibrium (both 
players invest 5 tokens), the theoretic best reply is never higher than 5 tokens and 
decreases for beliefs larger than 5. We find that subjects do not follow this rule. As a 
consequence, the discrepancy between theoretic prediction and observed behavior 
becomes larger the more aggressive the competitor is expected to be. The figure 
additionally shows that investment behavior cannot be described by playing a best reply 
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under Fehr-Schmidt-preferences (1999), either in expected or in realized payoffs (for 
more details see appendix B). 
Figure 2.3: Average responses to beliefs (BASELINE treatment). 
 
The matching pattern becomes even more apparent from the investment-belief-
ratio, presented in Figure 2.4. In order to demonstrate that the results are not driven by 
the symmetric equilibrium nor are just an arithmetic phenomenon, we present the 
distribution for all beliefs (Figure 2.4, panel A) and separately the distribution only for 
beliefs larger than 5 (Figure 2.4, panel B). In both cases, the pattern is very similar; we 
observe a significant peak at the value of 1, where the investment exactly matches the 
belief. The significant role of the revealed heuristic is also confirmed in the regression 
analysis (see Table 2.3 in appendix A). We conclude the following:  
 
Result 2.3: Subjects display a pattern of a linear reaction function (matching behavior 
with beliefs), which is in stark contrast to theoretic best replies. 
 
The linear reaction function helps explaining why most previous studies on rent-
seeking behavior report overbidding. It is likely that such results are driven by the 
responses to aggressive competitor’s behavior (or beliefs of high competitor’s 
investment). 
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Figure 2.4: Investment-Belief-Ratio (BASELINE treatment). 
Note: Investment-Belief-Ratio for beliefs different from 0 and censored at 5. 
 
 
We are aware of one previous study that employs elicitation of response 
functions. Herrmann and Orzen (2008) use the strategy method (Selten 1967) in a similar 
fashion as Fischbacher et al. (2001) do for public good games. Our result of a linear 
response function is not quite in line with the evidence reported by Herrmann and Orzen 
(2008), but it also does not strictly contradict their findings. The authors observe that 
about 1/3 of subjects in the repeated interactions display an increasing response function, 
whereas almost ½ of subjects display a hump-shaped response curve (Herrman and 
Orzen 2008, Table 4). Moreover, even for increasing-types, the reaction curve is far 
from linear, especially for lower investments by the competitor (Herrmann and Orzen 
2008, Figure 4). There are several possible design-related sources of these discrepancies 
with our results. The behavioral changes induced by the strategy method (instead of the 
direct responses in our experiment) are certainly one of to the most likely reasons (see 
Brandts and Charness 2011). 
Why do contestants deviate from best replies and match beliefs? Is it possible 
that the observed matching pattern is induced by the procedure of belief elicitation and 
we face a problem of an inverse causality, in which the chosen action induces reported 
beliefs? We can address this concern by comparing our results to previous experiments 
from Abbink et al. (2010) and Ahn et al. (2011), which are very similar in design but 
did not elicit beliefs. Both experimental studies include treatments where two players 
compete repeatedly in partner matching for an exogenously given prize. The main 
difference to our design is the value of the prize and, therefore, the resulting strategy 
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space. In both previous experiments, subjects invested an integer number between 0 and 
1,000 to win a prize of 1,000 tokens. All other main elements are the same as in our 
design.12 We compute average responses to beliefs under the assumption of myopic 
beliefs and present the results in a fashion analogous to Figure 2.3 in appendix A 
(Figures 2.16 & 2.17). Since in the previous experiments the investments were spread 
over a large strategy space, we aggregate them in 50-token increments in order to obtain 
reliable numbers of observations for computing average responses. We see that the 
matching pattern can also be found in the data collected by Abbink et al. (2010), as well 
as Ahn et al. (2011). This strongly speaks against the concern that the matching pattern 
is an artifact of our experimental procedure. 
Another explanation for the observed matching pattern could stem from the 
repeated play. Investment matching could be used as a punitive action to penalize 
aggressive competitors in order to deter their investments in the future. However, such 
motivation should lead to more matching behavior in early rounds and less towards the 
end of the experiment. A panel probit regression provides evidence against this 
explanation (see Table 2.4, Panel A in appendix A). We do not observe less matching in 
the later rounds of the experiment than at the beginning. Moreover, a recent study by 
Schier and Waligora (see Chapter 6) reports a similar linear response function in one-
shot Tullock contests, which also speaks against the role of dynamic interactions in the 
matching behavior. 
 
2.4.4. Observed responses to beliefs in the light of QRE-approach 
Previous studies used the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to explain 
experimental data on contests. QRE adds noise to the optimal behavior and helps to 
explain the over-dissipation of rents. We analyze how such an approach fits our results. 
As a statistical equilibrium concept, QRE relies on payoff perturbations and assumes 
that mistakes follow a random process. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) build their 
approach on the assumption that better actions (in terms of payoffs) are more likely to 
be chosen than worse actions. Both Sheremeta (2011) and Lim et al. (2014) apply the 
QRE-model to their aggregated data and estimate the precision parameter λ. In contrast 
                                                          
12 The only noteworthy difference from our design is the lump-sum endowment in Ahn et al.’s experiment, 
which is different from the per-period endowments in Abbink et al.’s as well as in our experiments. 
 19 
2. Beliefs and Behavior in Tullock Contests 
to these studies, we do not conduct a complex econometric analysis, but rather apply the 
basic intuition of QRE to our experimental data. 
One of the assumptions underlying QRE is that the probability of a mistake is 
reversely proportional to the foregone payoff. Hence, more costly mistakes are less 
likely. Figure 2.5 presents the distribution of investments in the BASELINE if the reported 
belief equals 10, for which the best response under standard preferences is 4. According 
to the QRE, smaller deviations from the best response should be more frequent than 
large (fairly costly) deviation. Even taking into account the distortive impact of 
prominent numbers (5, 10, 15), one cannot explain with the notion of payoff 
perturbations why a more costly mistake of investing 10 is three times more likely than 
a less costly mistake of investing 5. This clearly contradicts an explanation of the 
matching pattern drawn from QRE. We report similar regularities for other beliefs (see 
Figure 2.15 in appendix A). 
Figure 2.5: Distribution of investments if the reported belief equals 10 (n=138 from 36 
subjects). BASELINE treatment. 
 
2.5. The role of limited computational abilities 
Tullock contests between two players with linear probabilities are characterized 
by a well-defined best-response function (see eq. 2.3). Its algebraic form and its shape 
are, however, neither trivial nor intuitive. In our experimental treatment C1, we test 
whether the matching pattern is induced by subjects’ difficulties in computing 
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probabilities and expected payoffs.13 The only difference between C1 and BASELINE is 
the availability of a computational tool. At the decision stage, the computer mask 
includes a what-if calculator (see Figure 2.21 in appendix C). Subjects can enter the 
expected investment of the competitor, and the calculator displays expected winning 
probabilities and expected payoffs for every possible investment of the subject. Such a 
tool allows easily identification of the investment maximizing subject’s expected payoff 
as well as the one maximizing the expected winning probability, given a certain belief 
on competitor’s behavior. Moreover, subjects can compare their expected payoffs and 
winning probabilities with the expectations for the competitor in various scenarios. 
Subjects are allowed to use the calculator as many times as they want within the given 
decision time limit of 240 seconds in first ten rounds and 120 seconds in consecutive ten 
rounds.  
Our experimental data show that the behavior in treatment C1 is – at the 
aggregate level – very similar to that in BASELINE. Neither investments (mean: 6.855) 
nor beliefs (mean: 7.268) are significantly different from the results reported in the 
previous section (p-values 0.631 and 0.368, respectively). Additionally, Figures 2.10 to 
2.13 in appendix A illustrate that the behavior and reported beliefs in C1 are in several 
other dimensions very similar to those in BASELINE.  
In the next step, we test whether subjects in treatment C1 are more likely to play 
best responses than in the BASELINE treatment. In BASELINE, in 15.43 percent of 
observations, subjects play exactly best responses; in C1 this proportion amounts to 
15.00 percent. The difference is not significant (p>0.9). The same conclusion provides 
the panel data logit regression (see Table 2.4, Panel B in appendix A). 
One obvious reason for no difference between treatments would be that subjects 
do not use the calculator. Therefore, we examine whether participants indeed use the 
tool we provided. Fifty-three out of 56 subjects (94.6 percent) use the calculator in at 
least one period. Figure 2.20 in appendix A depicts that most subjects make use of the 
tool at the beginning of the experiment. In periods 1-3, the average number of entries is 
1.60, but it decreases rapidly, and by period 10 it drops to 0.18. The use of the calculator 
in the first periods is reflected in much longer decision times. Whereas in the BASELINE 
                                                          
13 Note that we call this treatment C1 due to notation we use in asymmetric treatments reported in Section 
2.6 (C stands for “calculator”). 
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subjects in periods 1-3 make their decision on average within 12.18 sec., in C1 they need 
52.34 sec. (see Figure 2.19 in appendix A). The difference is highly significant 
(p<0.001).  
Figure 2.6: Average responses to beliefs (treatment C1). 
 
Figure 2.6 demonstrates that the matching pattern in C1 is even slightly more 
pronounced than in the BASELINE. The regression analysis also confirms that the 
matching pattern is not induced by the limited computational abilities (Table 2.4, Panel 
A in appendix A). The figure additionally shows that, as in BASELINE, investment 
behavior cannot be described by best-reply behavior under Fehr-Schmidt-preferences 
(1999), either in expected or in realized payoffs (for more details see appendix B). 
 
Result 2.4: Subjects use the what-if calculator but still do not play best responses, in 
particular for high beliefs. Instead they tend to match their own behavior with beliefs. 
Thus, limited computational abilities do not seem to be the reason for the matching 
pattern in experimental contests.  
 
2.6. Beliefs and Behavior in Asymmetric Contests 
In order to disentangle whether the observed investment behavior is motivated 
by matching the opponent’s investment or matching the winning probability, we 
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introduce cost asymmetry between contestants.14 In three new treatments we manipulate 
the degree of asymmetry from relatively low to high. This provides richer insights into 
contest behavior and enhances our understanding of it. 
In asymmetric treatments, we vary the number of tickets subjects can purchase 
per token ( ≥ 1). The symmetric treatment C1, reported in the previous section, 
constitutes our benchmark. Consequently, the decision is framed across treatments as 
the number of tokens that a subject wants to spend on lottery tickets. Table 2.2 
summarizes the ticket costs in the treatments. The treatment name corresponds to the 
ratio tickets per token (;<=>?<@A B;CDEF/GHG>?<@A B;CDEF). Moreover, using eq. (2.4) we 
can compute the theoretic benchmarks of Nash equilibrium.15 
 
Table 2.2: Asymmetric treatments. Overview. 
 Treatment C1 C1.5 C2 C4 
# tickets per 
token spent 
low-cost type 1 3 2 4 
high-cost type 1 2 1 1 
Nash equilibrium (5, 5) (5, 5) (4, 4) (3, 3) 
 
2.6.1. Main behavioral regularities 
In all asymmetric treatments, both low-cost and high-cost players invest 
significantly more than in the Nash equilibrium (all p<0.05). The detailed statistics and 
test results are presented in Table 2.5 in appendix A. 
In order to recognize general behavioral patterns, we analyze in the first step the 
distributions of winning probabilities subjects believed they would achieve when 
making their decisions (see Figure 2.7). Expected winning probability results from own 
investments and reported beliefs. Inter-treatment and -type comparison allows us to 
identify three major behavioral regularities. 
First, we find that under low cost asymmetry (treatment C1.5) both low-cost and 
high-cost types tend to strive for equal or similar winning probability as their competitor. 
                                                          
14 With respect to asymmetric contests, our study is related to previous work by Anderson and Stafford 
(2003), Fonseca (2009), Anderson and Freeborn (2010) and Kimbrough et al. (2014). 
15 Note that we have to take the restriction on the strategy space into account; Subjects are allowed to 
invest integer numbers of tokens. 
 23 
2. Beliefs and Behavior in Tullock Contests 
The exact matching is not as pronounced as in the symmetric treatment (C1); this is 
probably partially attributable to exact matching in probabilities not always being 
possible under the asymmetric cost due to restrictions on the strategy space. 
Nevertheless, a great mass of distribution lies around 0.5. This is no longer the case 
under a larger cost asymmetry.  
Figure 2.7: Expected winning probability. Empirical distributions by treatment and cost type. 
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Second, low-cost types strongly match in investments, which – combined with a 
cost advantage – allows them to achieve high winning probabilities of 60%, 67%, and 
80% for treatments C1.5, C2, and C4, respectively.  
Third, high-cost types are more likely to give in when being highly 
disadvantaged. While the fraction of contestants investing zero is negligible under cost 
symmetry (in BASELINE and C1), it increases with an increasing cost asymmetry between 
contestants. Under high cost asymmetry, about one third of high-cost contestants decide 
to “surrender” by not buying even a single lottery ticket (see Figure 2.7 right panels).  
 
2.6.2. Matching pattern under cost asymmetry 
To answer the question posed at the beginning of this Section, namely whether 
the investment behavior is driven by a desire for equal investments or equal winning 
probabilities, we compare how often subjects follow these behavioral rules. Since exact 
matching under cost asymmetry was not always possible, we slightly weaken the 
definition of matching and allow for a deviation from the described rules by at most one 
token. Figure 2.8 depicts the likelihood of following the matching rule across treatments. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Likelihood to match in investments (panel A) 
 and in winning probabilities (panel B). 
 
The stronger the cost asymmetry, the lower the likelihood of low-cost players 
matching both in investments and in winning probabilities. However, the decreasing 
trend for the likelihood of matching winning probabilities is much stronger. This is 
confirmed by non-parametric analyses. While the Jonckheere-Terpstra test (JTT) for 
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ordered alternatives indicates an only weakly significant negative trend for likelihoods 
to match investments (p=0.052), it detects highly significant negative trend for the 
likelihood to match in probabilities (p<0.001, JTT). Moreover, the same conclusion 
provides a parametric analysis reported in Table 2.6 panel A in appendix A, where a 
much stronger and more significant effect of cost asymmetry is found for the matching 
in winning probabilities.  
For high cost players, both matching rules become less and less frequent under 
increasing cost asymmetry; JTT indicates in both cases a highly significant negative 
trend (p<0.001). Again, this conclusion is supported by the parametric regression 
analysis (see Table 2.6 panel B in appendix A). As the matching rules become less 
common under cost asymmetry, it is instructive to compare average behavior to the 
considered behavioral benchmarks. We normalize each decision with respect to 
predictions of matching in investments or matching in winning probabilities. A value of 
100% means that the matching behavior is exactly followed, while values over (under) 
100% indicate that a subject invests more (less) than the matching rule requires. The 
average values of normalized behavior are presented in Figure 2.9.16 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Average behavior normalized with respect to matching rules. 
 
In the symmetric treatment C1, subjects invest on average only slightly more 
than required for investment matching. In asymmetric treatments, however, low-cost 
                                                          
16 Note that if the reported belief is 0, the matching rule also predicts 0, which disables the normalization 
of the behavior. In these cases, we replace the benchmark of 0 with the benchmark of 1 and compare 
behavior with it. 
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players invest on average more than matching in investments would require; we observe 
a significant upward trend (p<0.001, JTT). Combined with the cost advantage effect, 
this gives them a rapidly increasing dominance in winning probabilities (p<0.001, JTT).  
High-cost players, in contrast, continue matching in investments even when the 
asymmetry increases, such that we find no significant trend (p=0.413, JTT). Under the 
increasing disadvantageous cost asymmetry, this leads to a significant downward trend 
in probability matching (p<0.001, JTT). 
We close our analysis of behavior in asymmetric contests with patterns of 
average responses to beliefs (see Figure 2.18 in appendix A). Here, again it becomes 
apparent that high-cost players tend to match in probabilities if the cost asymmetry is 
low (C1.5) and the expected opponent’s investment is relatively small. Otherwise, 
average responses follow the matching investment rule. 
We summarize our evidence on behavior in asymmetric contests in the following 
conclusion: 
 
Result 2.5: Subjects strive for equal winning probabilities only if the degree of 
asymmetry is low. Otherwise, low-cost players exploit their position to achieve high 
winning probabilities and often even deter the high-cost competitor from participating 
in the contest. 
 
2.7. Conclusion  
In our study, we extend the standard experimental setting of rent-seeking contests 
from previous research to include incentivized belief elicitation, which allows us to gain 
new insights into contest behavior. We show that our experimental design is not very 
intrusive and allows us to report results consistent with previous findings. However, it 
enriches our understanding of behavior in experimental contests in two significant 
dimensions. First, we find evidence for myopic (Cournot) beliefs; in repeated 
interactions under partner matching, subjects usually expect the competitor to behave 
exactly or similarly as in the last previous period. 
Moreover, the belief elicitation allows us to examine the empirical response 
function and to compare the behavioral responses with theoretic predictions. In stark 
contrast to the game-theoretic best-reply function, which is parabolic with its maximum 
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in the Nash equilibrium, we find a nearly linear response pattern. Subjects tend to match 
the beliefs about competitor’s behavior with their own behavior. Such regularity helps 
to explain why most previous experiments on Tullock contests report overbidding. 
While the best-reply function predicts a gradual surrendering for high beliefs, subjects 
tend to reciprocate aggressive behavior, which leads to costly rent-dissipation and results 
in well-documented overbidding.  
This result has political and economic implications because it reveals that rent-
seeking contests can easily intensify, which results in dissipation of huge amounts of 
resources. When expecting a competitor to behave aggressively, people usually respond 
with similarly aggressive behavior. This is in line with the notion of the proverb existing 
in several languages: “attack is the best form of defense.” However, this is in stark 
contrast to predictions of the game-theoretic analysis. Having found such a systematic 
and clear deviation from the best-reply function, it is not surprising that we do not 
observe Nash equilibrium behavior in rent-seeking experiments. 
The results can be interpreted in a broader context of competitive settings. Our 
study demonstrates how dangerous, costly and welfare-decreasing contests can be. 
People only rarely recognize that giving up is a better strategy than taking part in a very 
fierce competition. They are usually willing to make costly sacrifices to have a chance 
of winning against determined competitors. A prominent example is the educational and 
professional choices to enter a highly discriminating job market, e.g., for professional 
actors/actresses, musicians or scientists. 
To better understand the behavioral pattern of matching, we introduce cost 
asymmetry between contestants in a new series of experimental treatments. This allows 
us to better comprehend motives of matching and investigate whether behavioral 
patterns are robust against asymmetries. We find evidence that subjects strive for an 
equal (or at least similar) winning probability if the degree of asymmetry is small. 
However, under a larger cost asymmetry, low-cost players tend to exploit their favorable 
position by investing excessively more than necessary to achieve equal winning 
probabilities and dominate the contest by successfully deterring high-cost players. 
Observed linearity of the response function seems motivated by the desire to win. 
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2.8. Appendix A. Additional tables and figures 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Adjustment model (panel regression). 
Dependent variable:  
Inv(t) - Inv(t-1) 
BASELINE C1 
Baseline & C1 
(pooled) 
    
Best response(t) - Inv(t-1) 0.233*** 0.241*** 0.233*** 
 (0.067) (0.045) (0.066) 
Matching(t) - Inv(t-1) 0.361*** 0.422*** 0.361*** 
 (0.080) (0.049) (0.079) 
Calculator   -0.153 
   (0.236) 
Calculator x [Best-response(t) - Inv(t-1)]  0.008 
   (0.080) 
Calculator x [Matching(t) - Inv(t-1)]   0.061 
   (0.093) 
Constant 0.584*** 0.430*** 0.584*** 
 (0.179) (0.157) (0.177) 
Number of observations 1102 1064 2166 
Number of clusters 29 28 57 
Wald Chi-squared 87.88*** 136.16*** 245.76*** 
Notes: Panel regression with random subject effects. In parentheses, robust standard  
errors clustered at pairs of players. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Comments: 
Our approach is analogous to those adopted by Huck et al. (1999) as well as Fallucchi et al. (2013). We 
investigate which rule (playing best-responses vs. matching) more strongly drives behavior (measured 
with period-by-period adjustments). For details on the approach see the cited studies.  
We find that in both symmetric treatments (BASELINE & C1) the matching rule has a stronger effect on 
the behavior than best replies. Moreover, there is no significant treatment effect of the what-if-calculator. 
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Table 2.4: Panel probit regression for the event of matching behavior with beliefs (Panel A) 
and playing best responses (Panel B). 
A. Dependent variable:  
1[Investment=Belief] 
BASELINE & C1 
 (pooled) 
BASELINE & C1 
 (pooled) 
   
Period 0.016* 0.023** 
 (0.008) (0.011) 
Belief  -0.031 
  (0.029) 
1[Matching in equilibrium]  0.355*** 
  (0.119) 
1[Calculator provided]  -0.118 
  (0.342) 
Period x 1[Calculator provided]  -0.022 
  (0.015) 
Belief x 1[Calculator provided]  -0.005 
  (0.035) 
Constant -0.947*** -0.796*** 
 (0.100) (0.275) 
Number of observations 2280 2280 
Number of clusters 114 114 
Wald Chi-squared 8.51*** 40.21*** 
 
B. Dependent variable:  
1[Investment=Best-reply] 
BASELINE & C1 
 (pooled) 
BASELINE & C1 
 (pooled) 
   
Period  -0.014 
  (0.011) 
Belief  -0.068** 
  (0.032) 
1[Calculator provided] 0.113 -0.124 
 (0.229) (0.384) 
Period x 1[Calculator provided]  0.043** 
  (0.017) 
Belief x 1[Calculator provided]  -0.033 
  (0.046) 
Constant -1.384*** -0.806*** 
 (0.194) (0.277) 
Number of observations 2280 2280 
Number of clusters 114 114 
Wald Chi-squared 0.4 56.79*** 
Notes: Panel probit regression with random subject effects. In parentheses, robust standard 
 errors clustered at pairs of players. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics across treatments and types. 
Treatment Type 
Cost: Ticktes pro 
token 
Equilibrium 
prediction 
Average 
 investment 
Standard 
deviation 
H0:  
Investment = NE 
BASELINE  1 5 6.483 4.391 p=0.013 
C1  1 5 6.855 4.612 p=0.001 
C1.5 Low-cost 2 5 7.007 4.168 p=0.001 
C1.5 High-cost 3 5 6.540 4.781 p=0.013 
C2 Low-cost 2 4 6.529 3.750 p<0.001 
C2 High-cost 1 4 4.970 4.900 p=0.032 
C4 Low-cost 4 3 5.553 3.979 p<0.001 
C4 High-cost 1 3 4.788 5.512 p=0.004 
Notes: p-values from the Fisher-Pitman permutation tests (two-sided) at the level of independent observations. 
 
Table 2.6: Behavior in asymmetric treatments (panel probit regression). 
Dependent 
 variable: 
A. Low cost types 
  Dependent  
variable: 
B. High cost types 
1[surrender] 
1[Match  
investments] 
1[Match  
probabilities]   
1[surrender] 
1[Match  
investments] 
1[Match  
probabilities] 
Cost asymmetry 0.026 -0.121* -0.315***   Cost asymmetry 0.717*** -0.224*** -0.629*** 
 (0.166) (0.064) (0.085)    (0.130) (0.071) (0.082) 
Constant -3.424*** -0.182 -0.137   Constant -3.797*** -0.206 0.174 
 (0.704) (0.154) (0.199)    (0.398) (0.163) (0.181) 
Observations 2900 2900 2900   Observations 2899 2899 2899 
Clusters 117 117 117   Clusters 117 117 117 
Wald Chi-squared 0.03 4.03** 15.34***   Wald Chi-squared 28.02*** 12.30*** 65.43*** 
Notes: Panel probit regression with random subject effects. In parentheses, robust standard errors clustered on pairs. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 2.10: Distribution of investments over treatments. 
 
Figure 2.11: Distribution of beliefs over treatments. 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Investment
BASELINE
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Investment
C1
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Investment
C1.5: Low cost
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Investment
C1.5: High cost
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Investment
C2: Low cost
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Investment
C2: High cost
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Investment
C4: Low cost
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Investment
C4: High cost
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Belief
BASELINE
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Belief
C1
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Belief
C1.5: Low cost
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Belief
C1.5: High cost
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Belief
C2: Low cost
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Belief
C2: High cost
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Belief
C4: Low cost
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 5 10 15 20
Belief
C4: High cost
 32 
2. Beliefs and Behavior in Tullock Contests 
Figure 2.12: 
Myopic beliefs over treatments. 
 
Figure 2.13: Belief inaccuracy over treatments. 
Note: Inaccuracy defined as the absolute value of the difference between the belief and the actual competitor’s behavior. 
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Figure 2.14: Average investments over treatments. 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Distribution of investments for a certain belief (BASELINE treatment). 
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Figure 2.16: Average responses to myopic beliefs in the experiment by Abbink et al. (2010). 
Note: We use the data from 1:1-treatment (28 subjects in partner matching, i.e., 14 independent observations, over 20 periods). 
The data is publicly available under: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.420 [last access: July 3, 
2015] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.17: Average responses to myopic beliefs in the experiment by Ahn et al. (2011). 
Note: We use pooled data from the first part in treatments baseline, AG, and SG. 
The data was kindly provided by Tim Salmon. 
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 Figure 2.18: Average responses to beliefs. Asymmetric treatments. 
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Figure 2.19: Average decision times over treatments. 
Note: In all treatments, subjects had max. 240 seconds of time for decision in periods 1-10  
and 120 seconds in periods 11-20. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.20: Average number of entries in the what-if-calculator. 
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2.9. Appendix B. Contest behavior under Fehr-Schmidt preferences 
(1999) 
 
We investigate the effect of inequity aversion on behavior in Tullock (1980) 
contests and utilize the standard modeling approach by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Player 
i’s utility depends on both her own monetary payoff and the equity of payoffs between 
players. I =  − J maxK0;  − L − M maxK0;  − L 
As noted by Herrmann and Orzen (2008), it is not straightforward how inequity 
aversion works in the studied setting. In general, one can consider two modeling 
approaches: Players suffer from inequity in realized (ex-post) payoffs, or they dislike 
inequity in expected terms. Since both alternatives can be rationalized, we leave open 
which approach is more accurate and consider both. For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that the inequity parameters (J, M) are symmetric between two contestants and 
common knowledge.  
First, following Herrman and Orzen (2008) we assume that players are inequity 
averse in realized payoffs. Therefore, given our experiment parameters E and V in the 
symmetric treatments BASELINE and C1, contestant ’s utility is expressed with: 
NIO = 20 −  +  +  P20 − M20 −  + Q − J  +  20 −  +  
Alternatively, if subjects display inequity aversion with respect to expected 
payoffs, ’s utility is expressed with: 
NIO = 20 −  +  +  20 − J max R0;  −  +  20 +  − S
− M max R0;  −  +  20 −  + S 
Taking into account the estimates of the parameters from various experiments 
considered in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as well as those reported by Blanco et al. (2011), 
we assume in our analysis the following, modest values of the inequity aversion 
parameters: J = 1;  M = 0.25. 
We use the above utility specifications and assumed parameter values to derive 
best replies under the restriction of limited strategy space (integer numbers between 0 
and 20). The results are plotted in Figures 2.3 and
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2.10. Appendix C. Decision screens and experimental instructions 
Figure 2.21: Decision screen in treatment C1 (also part of the written instructions to subjects). 
Translation from German. 
 
Figure 2.22: Feedback screen in treatment C1. Translation from German. 
 
 
 39 
2. Beliefs and Behavior in Tullock Contests 
 
 
Figure 2.23: Contest result screen in treatment C1. Translation from German. 
 
Instructions in treatment C1 (translation from German) 
General information 
Welcome to our experiment! It is important that you carefully read and understand the 
following instructions. If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will then come 
to you and answer it. Communication with other participants before and during the 
experiment is prohibited. If you violate this rule, you will have to leave the experiment 
and will not receive any payment. 
You can earn money in this experiment. You will receive 2.50 EUR for your 
participation. You can earn additional money during the experiment. The amount of 
money you earn depends on your decisions and decisions of other participants in the 
experiment. Your earnings are denoted in tokens. These will be converted in EUR and 
paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate is: 
45 tokens = 1 EUR. 
The experiment consists of several rounds. Tokens you earn in each round are added to 
your tokens account. Your payoff is the sum of the tokens you have earned in all rounds 
 40 
2. Beliefs and Behavior in Tullock Contests 
of the experiment. No participant will receive information about your payoff in the 
experiment or your identity. 
Course of the experiment 
In today’s experiment you will interact with another participant. In a minute you will be 
randomly matched with an opponent. In every pair there will be a player A (marked 
blue) and a player B (marked red). The roles are also randomly assigned. The pairings 
as well as the roles remain unchanged for the entire experiment. Information about your 
role will be displayed on the screen before the first round begins. 
The experiment consists of 20 rounds. All rounds proceed in the same way. 
In each round, you and your opponent will compete in a lottery for a prize. 
At the beginning of each round, you receive from us 20 tokens. Then, you can decide 
how many tokens you want to spend on lottery tickets. For one token you can purchase 
one ticket (1 token = 1 ticket). You can purchase as many tickets as you want, but you 
are not allowed to exceed your budget. Tokens that you do not spend on lottery tickets 
are added to your account. 
The prize that you can win in the lottery in each round is 20 tokens. 
Your chance of winning depends only on how many tickets you have bought and how 
many your opponent has bought. The more tickets you have bought, the more likely it 
is that you win. Another way around, the more tickets your opponent has bought, the 
less likely it is that you win. The probabilities with which you win the prize are equal to 
the number of your tickets divided by the number of all tickets bought. This means it is 
computed according to the following rule: 
Your probability of winning =  Number of your ticketsNumber of your tickets +   Number of opponent′s tickets  
 
Your earnings in a single round are as follows: 
Your earnings if you win = 20 – your investment in the tickets + 20 
Your earnings if you lose = 20 – your investment in the tickets  
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If only one player has bought tickets, she/he wins with certainty. If neither of the players 
has bought any tickets, the lottery does not take place and nobody wins the prize. 
 
Each round consists of three steps: 
Step 1 
In the first step, you decide how many tickets you would like to purchase. At the same 
time, your opponent makes the same decision. 
While you make your decision, you can use a what-if-calculator. You can insert a 
hypothetical investment of by your opponent, and the calculator computes the winning 
probabilities and expected payoffs for you and your opponent, subject to your 
investment. 
The expected payoff is computed in the following way: 
 
 
You can use the calculator as often as you want. Please just insert a value in the field the 
opponent’s investment and click on “Compute” (see red field (1) in Figure 1). 
The example in Figure 1 shows the what-if-calculator for a hypothetical investment of 
10. You can see in the table that your probability of winning is 16.67%, and your 
expected payoff equals 21.33 if you invest 2 tokens. If you invest 19 tokens, is your 
winning probability is 65.52% and your expected payoff 14.10.  
In every round you should insert within the given time your final decision in the fields 
on the right-hand side of the screen and confirm with the button “OK” (see red field (2) 
in figure 1). You are asked not only about your investment, but also what investment 
you expect from your opponent. For this you can earn a bonus of maximal 4 tokens. The 
amount of the bonus depends on how good your prediction was. The smaller the mistake 
in your prediction, the higher your bonus. The bonus is computed in the following way. 
Bonus = 4 − 0.4 ∗ Mistake 
Expected 
payoff 
= 
Payoff if 
you win 
X X Probability that 
you win 
+ Probability that 
you lose 
Payoff if you 
lose 
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The mistake is the difference between your prediction and actual opponent’s 
investment: 
Mistake = |Your prediction − actual opponentbs investment| 
If the mistake is larger than 3, the bonus is 0. This means there is no negative bonus; you 
cannot lose any tokens for your prediction. 
Time for your decision in every round is limited. In the first ten rounds you have 4 
minutes time, in the next 10 rounds 2 minutes. 
Step 2 
In the second step, you get feedback on the opponent’s decision, in other words, how 
many tickets she/he has bought. Probabilities of winning are also computed and 
displayed. All tickets bought are numerated. You get information on which numbers 
correspond to your tickets and which to tickets of your opponent. In order to make it 
clearer, this is also displayed graphically.  
Each ticket is equally likely to be drawn. 
You also receive feedback on how good your prediction about your opponent’s 
investment was and how large your bonus is. 
 
Step 3 
In the last step, the winning ticket is drawn. The computer draws one of bought tickets. 
The number of the winning ticket and the winner are displayed on the screen, as are your 
earnings in the current round. 
 
[Subjects received also a screen shot of the decision stage mask – see Figure 21. The 
only difference is that we marked decision fields with red frames – as described in the 
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Chapter 3: 
ON THE RELUCTANCE TO PLAY 
BEST RESPONSES IN TULLOCK 
CONTESTS 
 
Joint work with Bettina Rockenbach 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Despite a long tradition of experimental investigation of rent-seeking contests 
(Tullock 1980), behavior observed in the lab is still not fully comprehended. As 
summarized by Sheremeta (2013, 2014), several robust findings remain puzzling. Most 
attention has been devoted to overbidding, whereby subjects in experimental contests 
invest on average more than the Nash equilibrium predicts and equilibrium behavior is 
rarely observed in the lab. One could argue that equilibrium behavior is not supported 
by the theory if the opponents play off-equilibrium strategies. In a recent study, 
Rockenbach and Waligora (see Chapter 2) conducted a systematic analysis of beliefs 
and behavior in experimental Tullock contests to answer the question whether best 
responses to off-equilibrium-behavior are more frequently played. They show that the 
average response function observed in the lab is almost linear, which is very different 
from the theoretic prediction. The observed pattern is induced by frequent belief-
matching behavior (i.e., subjects investing as much as they expect from the opponent) 
rather than best-responding. This suggests that best responses are rare in general. 
Furthermore, they do not become more frequent over time in repeated contests. 
In the current study, we strive to understand why best responses in experimental 
contests are rare and investigate the effect of the matching protocol on investment 
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behavior in repeated Tullock contests. Partner matching is a common design feature in 
experiments on contest behavior. However, both theoretical analyses and experimental 
evidence from previous studies prompt us to expect that repeated interactions with the 
same competitor make subjects follow other goals than maximizing expected payoffs 
from the current period. Subjects might attempt to deter the opponent from the 
competition (Selten 1978), they might strive for collusion (Andreoni and Croson 2008; 
Huck et al. 2004), or they can influence opponents’ future behavior in other ways, e.g., 
through punishment (Fehr and Gächter 2000) or reputation building (Kreps et al. 1982; 
Bohnet and Huck 2004).  
Hence, different matching protocols may induce different goals and strategies. 
However, in the context of a rent-seeking contest, subjects may face computational 
difficulties that hamper the implementation of the intended behavior. For instance, the 
best reply function in symmetric two-player contests is neither trivial nor intuitive. 
Therefore, subjects might not best-respond simply because they cannot compute best 
responses. In order to control for potential computational limitations, in our study we 
not only manipulate the matching protocol, but also the saliency level of best responses 
across experimental conditions. 
The results we report here are clear. In our experiment, the matching protocol 
has no significant effect on average investments or the response function. Therefore, we 
find no evidence of strategic non-best-responding. This result holds regardless of 
providing hints at what the best response is. On the other hand, we show that making 
best responses extremely salient increases the willingness to play them. The frequency 
of best response behavior rises from 3 to 22 percent. This means that limited 
computational abilities are at least partially responsible for the rarity of best responses 
in experimental contests.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate 
our research questions and review related literature. In Section 3, we briefly sketch the 
theoretical framework. Section 4 describes our experimental design and the research 
hypotheses. We present the results in Section 5, before concluding in Section 6. 
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3.2. Research questions and related literature 
Our study contributes to research on rent-seeking behavior and has both political 
and methodological implications. We investigate whether different matching protocols 
in repeated contests induce different strategies and behavioral patterns. In repeated 
interactions between partners – relying on the argument of backward induction – the 
unique equilibrium prediction of a stage game holds if the number of repetitions is finite 
and known to all players. However, experimental results have shown that actual 
behavior often differs. 
The deviation from the equilibrium prediction may have various causes, like 
information asymmetry or uncertainty about the rationality of the competitor (see Kreps 
and Wilson 1982; Milgrom and Roberts 1982; Kreps et al. 1982) or deterrence strategies 
(Selten 1978): Subjects bid very aggressively in the initial round of the contest to deter 
the opponent from the competition in the later rounds. Moreover, experimental evidence 
suggests that the matching protocol is likely to influence the willingness to cooperate 
despite the horizon of the game being finite. Similar patterns have been shown for 
instance in experiments on public goods provision (see Andreoni and Croson 2008 for 
an overview). 
The question about the role of the matching protocol in bidding behavior is 
relevant for both researchers designing experimental contests and contest designers 
outside of economic laboratories. If repeated interactions between contestants lead to 
systematic behavioral distortions, designers of both experimental and outside-the-lab 
contests shall be more careful about who to let compete with whom in repeated contests 
and whether to provide information about the identity of other competitors. In 
experimental contests, both random stranger and partner matching have been very 
common. However, the evidence on the effects is mixed. In a meta-analysis, Sheremeta 
(2013) compares behavior observed across 30 independent studies finding no systematic 
effect of the matching protocol. By contrast, Baik et al. (2016) who recently investigated 
the effect of the matching protocol and group size in experimental Tullock contests 
report significantly more overbidding in two-player contests under stranger protocol 
than among partners. Not only do we contribute to the discussion on the effect of the 
matching protocol on average bidding behavior, but we also extend this question by a 
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new aspect, investigating how the matching protocol alters choices of strategies, 
particularly considering the willingness to play best responses to reported beliefs. 
The implementation of intended strategies induced with different matching 
protocols might be impaired by computational limitations that subjects face during the 
experiment. This is likely the case because the environment of a Tullock contest can be 
cognitively demanding for subjects in the lab. Two previous studies provide clues on the 
relation between the complexity of the contest environment and behavior. In a cleverly 
designed experiment, Masiliunas et al. (2014) show that making contests cognitively 
simpler for subjects increases the explanatory power of the Nash equilibrium. The 
authors thus conclude that “bounded rationality rather than preference heterogeneity is 
the reason for the typically large behavioral variation in experimental Tullock contests” 
(Masiliunas et al. 2014, p. 21). However, Masiliunas et al. manipulate the ease of 
formulating best responses differently than we do. Rather than providing subjects with 
a computational tool, the authors replace the lottery contest with a share contest, in which 
a prize is divided and distributed to players according to their shares in the total 
investment. Such a variation does not change the equilibrium prediction as an expected 
value of the prize is simply replaced with a realized value of the prize. The authors argue 
that the process of identifying best responses is nevertheless facilitated due to the lesser 
uncertainty of outcomes. Masiliunas et al. show that simply replacing the lottery contest 
with a share contest is insufficient to induce a higher frequency of best responses and 
further simplifications are required (see Masiliunas et al. 2014, Result 2).  
Such a conclusion is additionally supported by a study by Chowdhury et al. 
(2014). The authors also manipulate features of contest design, keeping the equilibrium 
prediction unchanged. Similar to Masiuliunas et al., Chowdhury et al. find that if the 
prize sharing rule is the only manipulation, the magnitude of overbidding does not 
change.1 Accordingly, both studies show that one can induce behavior closer to Nash 
equilibrium when manipulating the contest in at least two dimensions, whereby the share 
rule is one of them. Still, this finding does not answer the question of why best responses 
                                                          
1 Fallucchi et al. (2013) also compare behavior in experimental contests under both the share and the 
lottery rule. However, the focus of their analysis is different and the authors do not report whether the 
difference in average investments between the corresponding treatments is statistically significant. 
Moreover, Shupp et al. (2013) compare behavior across different prize allocation rules. However, the 
authors observe underbidding (i.e., investments significantly smaller than equilibrium prediction), which 
is in stark contrast to rich evidence on overbidding in experimental contests. 
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are so rare in the original form of the contest. The result of more frequent best responses 
in other contests does not explain the rarity of best responses in conventional Tullock 
contests.2 Rather than manipulating the contest rules, we investigate behavior in the 
original form of the Tullock contest and provide subjects with direct information 
concerning what the best response is. This is what makes our study complementary to 
those reported above. 
 
3.3. The theoretical framework 
We consider rent-seeking contests (in a framework due to Tullock 1980) between 
two ex-ante symmetric risk-neutral expected-payoff maximizing players (called A and 
B). Both contestants are budget-constrained with the initial budget of E and compete for 
a single and non-divisible monetary prize V. In the course of the contest, both players 
simultaneously spend monetary resources, which determine their winning probabilities. 
While investments made by both contestants are sunk, the outcome of the competition 
is stochastic. Assume that player A invests c and player B invests d. Subsequently, 
the winning probabilities are as follows: 
c = cc + d  ;     d = 1 − c (3.1) 
Therefore, the expected payoff of player  ∈ -f, 8 is: NO =  −  +  (3.2) 
One can define this situation as a static game of complete information. It has a 
unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, in which both players invest V/4 (Szidarovsky 
and Okuguchi 1997). Moreover, the best response function is at its maximum in 
equilibrium and all investments higher than the equilibrium level are strictly dominated.  
 
3.4. The experiment 
3.4.1. Experimental implementation 
The Tullock contest between two subjects is framed in the experiment as a lottery 
for the prize of V=100 tokens. The stage game proceeds always in three steps. First, 
                                                          
2 See Selten (1990, p. 651) for a similar argument in the discussion on the chain-store-paradox, as well as 
Chowdhury et al.’s (2014, p. 233) conclusion from their experiment. 
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subjects are endowed with E=100 tokens, whereby they can decide how many they want 
to spend on lottery tickets. For one token they purchase one ticket. The strategy space is 
restricted to integer numbers. At the same time, subjects report what investment they 
expect from the competitor. Belief elicitation is incentivized, whereby subjects are paid 
according to a quadratic loss function between 20 and 0.3,4 In the second step, subjects 
receive feedback about their opponent’s investment and resulting winning probabilities. 
In step three, the computer randomly draws one of the tickets. The owner of the drawn 
ticket receives the prize and subjects are informed about their payoffs from the game. 
The stage game is repeated for 30 periods. All periods have the same timing and are 
payoff-relevant. The experimental tokens are converted into Euros at the exchange rate 
270 tokens=1 EUR. 
 
3.4.2. Experimental treatments 
We employ a 2x2 factorial design. The treatment variables are the matching 
protocol and the saliency of best responses. In one dimension, we implement either a 
partner matching or a random stranger matching in sub-groups of six subjects. In another 
dimension, we vary the presence of the computational tool in the decision stage. In the 
CALCULATOR treatments, the computer displays several different investment proposals, 
given the subject’s reported belief: 1) investment maximizing the expected payoff; 2) 
investment leading to the same expected payoff as the opponent; and 3) investment 
maximizing the winning probability (see Figure 3.1). Each proposal is placed in a 
separate box, including information on the winning probability as well as payoffs in the 
case of winning and losing. Subjects are also free not to choose any of the displayed 
proposals but rather insert any investment between zero and 100 (see most right box in 
Figure 3.1). In BASE treatments, subjects follow the same two-step decision process 
(state beliefs and then own investment), albeit without being exposed to any investment 
proposals. 
                                                          
3 The applied function is: Bonus for belief = max -0; 20 − 0.5 ∙ (Belief − Actual investment)8. 
4
 Procedure of incentivizing beliefs always raises the question about possible hedging strategies (see e.g., 
Blanco et al. 2010). Whereas we cannot completely rule out such behavior, we do not recognize any 
behavioral patterns indicating hedging. Moreover, monetary incentives for belief elicitation were 
relatively low in comparison to stakes in the main task. In our experiment, subjects earned on average 
122.6 tokens per period, out of which only 6.3 tokens were bonus for belief. Therefore, the bonus 
amounted to only 5.2% of the total profit, which demonstrates that hedging strategies could not be very 
successful.  
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Figure 3.1: Decision screen in PARTNER_CALCULATOR treatment. Translation from German. 
 
Choosing the first proposal – investments maximizing the expected payoff – 
corresponds to playing a best response to the state belief. Nonetheless, other proposals 
may also be appealing, particularly in repeated play with partners. Rockenbach and 
Waligora (see Chapter 2) show that belief-matching (proposal 2) is a common strategy 
under partner matching. It may be motivated by the unwillingness to give up against an 
aggressive opponent or by inequity aversion. Proposal 3 can be interpreted as an 
implementation of a deterrence or punishment strategy: very aggressive behavior to 
deter the opponent from the contest or punish the opponent for previous play. Moreover, 
such a richer set of alternatives also mitigates the experimenter demand effect (Zizzo 
2010), as subjects are not exposed to a single proposal. Similar computational tools that 
provide information on best responses have been frequently used in experimental studies 
on behavior in Cournot oligopolies (Huck et al. 1999; Raab and Schipper 2009).5  
Two treatment variables interacting with each other lead to the following four 
treatments, as summarized in Table 3.1. 
 
 
                                                          
5 See Table 1 in Requate and Waichman (2011) for an overview. 
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Table 3.1: Experimental treatments. 
 
 
Computational  
tool 
 Matching protocol 
 Partner Stranger 
No 
PARTNER_BASE 
(58/29) 
STRANGER_BASE 
(60/10) 
Yes 
PARTNER_CALCULATOR 
(58/29) 
STRANGER_CALCULATOR 
(60/10) 
Note: In parentheses: (number of subjects / numbers of independent observations). 
 
3.4.3. Hypotheses 
We design the experiment to test several hypotheses concerning the effects of 
the matching protocol and the presence of a computational tool. The null hypotheses 
describe the behavior of homo oeconomicus in games with common knowledge of 
rationality. Based upon previously described considerations, we also formulate 
behavioral alternative hypotheses. 
To investigate the joint effect of the matching protocol, we compare behavior in 
the two BASE treatments. The game-theoretic prediction does not change under the 
assumption of complete information and common rationality. However, if we relax these 
assumptions repeated interactions with the same opponent might induce intertemporal 
dynamics and strategies different from best-responding, i.e., belief-matching or 
aggressive deterrence strategies. The partners can also tacitly collude. Although two 
players cannot share the prize among themselves in a single period, they can do so in 
repeated interactions by agreeing that alternately one of them does not participate in the 
lottery in every second period. Alternatively, players may agree to make the lowest 
positive investment (i.e., 1 token) in every period and thus they both always have a 50 
percent winning chance. 
 
Hypothesis 3.1 (effect of the matching protocol): PARTNER_ BASE vs STRANGER_BASE  
H0: Behavior in PARTNER_BASE and STRANGER_BASE treatments is not systematically 
different.  
HA: In STRANGER_BASE, best responses are more frequent than in PARTNER_BASE 
treatment. 
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The inference about the effect of the matching protocol from the comparison 
between the BASE treatments might be confounded with the effect of limited 
computational abilities. Subjects might strive for best-responding under the STRANGER 
condition, although they may be hampered by difficulties in computing it. Therefore, we 
also test the matching protocol effect in CALCULATOR treatments, in which we provide 
direct hints at best responses. Computational abilities no longer hinder best-responding 
and we can disentangle the two effects. Therefore, hypothesis 3.2 is very similar to 
hypothesis 3.1, although it tests the effect of the matching protocol under a high saliency 
of best responses.  
 
Hypothesis 3.2 (effect of the matching protocol): PARTNER_CALCULATOR vs 
STRANGER_CALCULATOR 
H0: Behavior in PARTNER_CALCULATOR and STRANGER_CALCULATOR treatments is not 
systematically different.  
HA: In STRANGER_CALCULATOR, best responses are more frequent than in 
PARTNER_CALCULATOR treatment. 
A comparison of the treatment effects that we investigate in hypotheses 3.1 and 
3.2 provides additional, complementing evidence on the possible interplay between the 
matching protocol and limited computational abilities. Applying the difference-in-
differences-approach, we test whether the effects of the matching protocol are different 
under low and high saliency of best responses.  
 
Hypothesis 3.3 (Difference-in-differences) 
H0: The matching protocol effect is the same under low (BASE) and high (CALCULATOR) 
saliency of best responses. 
HA: The effect of the matching protocol is stronger in the CALCULATOR condition than 
in the BASE condition. 
Finally, under the stranger matching protocol subjects do not have intertemporal 
incentives to deviate from best responses in the current period. Deterrence strategies, 
collusion, punitive behavior, etc. are not possible. Therefore, a comparison of STRANGER 
treatments allows us to measure the effect of limited computational abilities. Homo 
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oeconomicus does not face any difficulties with identifying best responses. However, it 
is likely that subjects in the lab often cannot compute the optimal response by 
themselves. Hence, we expect that the computational tool will increase the frequency of 
best responses.  
 
Hypothesis 3.4 (the effect of computational abilities): STRANGER_BASE vs 
STRANGER_CALCULATOR 
H0: In STRANGER_CALCULATOR, best responses are as frequent as in STRANGER_BASE. 
HA: In STRANGER_CALCULATOR, best responses are more frequent than in 
STRANGER_BASE. 
 
3.4.4. Procedure 
We conducted the experiment in April and May 2016 at the Cologne Laboratory for 
Economic Research (CLER), Germany. 236 subjects (undergraduate and graduate 
students with various majors; 58% female) were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner 2015) 
and always participated in only one session. The experiment was computerized using z-
Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Experimental sessions lasted between 75 and 90 minutes and 
average earnings amounted to 20.4 EUR, including a 4 EUR show-up fee.6 
 
3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Overbidding and overspreading  
In PARTNER_BASE treatment, as our control condition, we replicate results from 
previous experiments on Tullock contests (e.g., BASELINE treatment in Chapter 2). In 
PARTNER_BASE, subjects invest on average 34.7 tokens, which is more than the Nash 
equilibrium of 25. The difference is statistically significant (p=0.023).7,8 The average 
magnitude of overbidding (38.9%) is comparable to previous studies. Similarly, we find 
overspreading, whereby subjects use the entire strategy space, although prominent 
                                                          
6 After the main part of the experiment, subjects also participated in a short incentivized task eliciting their 
risk-preferences.  
7 Throughout the paper, we report p-values from non-parametric (two-sided) Fisher-Pitman permutation 
tests. Hereafter: FP test. 
8 In treatments with the partner matching protocol, a pair of players over 30 periods constitutes one 
independent observations, while in treatments with stranger matching it is a group of six players over 30 
periods.  
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numbers (multiples of 5) are more frequently chosen than others (see Figure 3.6 in 
Appendix A). We do not observe any significant time trend, nor learning towards Nash 
equilibrium. Furthermore, we find no noteworthy differences with respect to myopia and 
the precision of reported beliefs. The empirical response function closely resembles that 
one reported in Chapter 2 (see Figure 3.8, panel A in Appendix A). We conclude: 
 
Result 3.1: PARTNER_BASE treatment replicates results reported in previous studies.  
 
3.5.2. The effect of the matching protocol 
In order to test hypothesis 3.1, we compare behavior in the BASE treatments, in 
which subjects are not equipped with the computational tool. Figure 3.2 reveals that the 
bidding behavior is similar. Average investments amount to 34.7 and 38.0 tokens in 
PARTNER_BASE and STRANGER_BASE treatment, respectively. The difference is 
statistically insignificant (p=0.652, FP test). A parametric regression analysis comes to 
the same conclusion (see regression [I] in Table 3.7, Appendix A). This result is 
consistent with Sheremeta’s (2013) meta-analysis. We also compare behavioral 
responses to reported beliefs. Figure 3.8 (panels A and B) in Appendix A reveals that 
the patterns are similar.  
Table 3.2 summarizes strategies applied in BASE treatments. We observe that the 
structures are quite similar in several dimensions. In both treatments, only about 2.5 
percent of investments correspond to best responses. Furthermore, the fractions of 
belief-matching and striving for maximal winning probabilities are not strongly 
different. On the other hand, we observe that collusion between contestants is more 
likely to emerge under partner matching, as we find more of such behavior (15.1% vs 
0.3%).9 When tested non-parametrically, the difference is insignificant (p=0.121, FP 
test), given that all collusive behavior is concentrated in a small number of player-pairs 
(5 out of 29). However, the parametric regression analysis detects, a significant effect of 
the matching protocol on the likelihood of collusion (see regression [III] in Table 3.4). 
We do not find any evidence of deterrence strategies, whereby high investments are not 
more frequent between partners than strangers. Accordingly, we can conclude: 
 
                                                          
9 As described in Section 4.3, we classify the following cases as collusion: Investment=1 & Belief=0; 
Investment=0 & Belief=1; Investment=Belief=1. 
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Result 3.2: We fail to reject the null hypothesis 3.1. In STRANGER_BASE, best responses 
are not more frequent than in PARTNER_BASE. 
Figure 3.2: Average investments over time. BASE treatments. 
We conduct a similar analysis on the effect of the matching protocol when 
providing subjects with direct hints at best responses and compare behavior in the 
CALCULATOR treatments. Average investments in PARTNER_CALCULATOR and 
STRANGER_CALCULATOR are 28.4 and 33.6, respectively. The difference is not 
significant (p=0.180, FP test). Figure 3.4 and Table 3.3 provide a more detailed picture 
of the treatment effect. Table 3 shows that the fraction of best responses is very similar 
in both treatments and amounts to about 20 percent (p=0.995, FP test). We find somehow 
more belief-matching in the PARTNER condition than in the STRANGER condition, 
although the difference is statistically insignificant (p=0.125, FP test). Furthermore, the 
difference in the frequency of the collusive behavior is not significant (p=0.533, FP test). 
In general, the overview of the treatments effects in the CALCULATOR treatments 
resembles the previous analysis for the BASE condition. 
 
Result 3.3: We fail to reject the null hypothesis 3.2. In STRANGER_CALCULATOR, best 
responses are not more frequent than in PARTNER_CALCULATOR.
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Figure 3.3: Beliefs and investments in BASE treatments. 
 
Table 3.2: Structure of behavioral responses to beliefs in BASE treatments. 
A. PARTNER: 
Decision 
Fraction  
B. STRANGER: 
Decision 
Fraction 
Best response * 2.8%  Best response * 2.4% 
Matching ** 12.2%  Matching ** 10.7% 
Collusion 15.1%  Collusion 0.3% 
Max winning 
probability 
0.7%  Max winning 
probability 
0.3% 
Other decision 69.2%  Other decision 86.2% 
* Except for Belief=0 & Investment=1. 
 
* Except for Belief=0 & Investment=1. 
** Out of Nash equilibrium and no collusion.  ** Out of Nash equilibrium and no collusion. 
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Figure 3.4: Beliefs and investments in CALCULATOR treatments. 
 
Table 3.3: Structure of behavioral responses to beliefs in CALCULATOR treatments.  
A. PARTNER: 
Decision 
Fraction  
B. STRANGER: 
Decision 
Fraction 
Best response * 20.9%  Best response * 22.1% 
Matching ** 15.5%  Matching ** 9.6% 
Collusion 7.1%  Collusion 0.2% 
Max winning 
probability 
0.7%  Max winning 
probability 
1.7% 
Other decision 55.8%  Other decision 66.4% 
* Except for Belief=0 & Investment=1. 
 
* Except for Belief=0 & Investment=1. 
** Out of Nash equilibrium and no collusion.  ** Out of Nash equilibrium and no collusion. 
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3.5.3. Difference-in-differences 
The results 3.2 and 3.3 in the previous section suggest that the matching protocol 
effects are qualitatively similar across conditions of a low or high saliency of best 
responses. We complement this conclusion with a quantitative analysis. The parametric 
probit regressions of the likelihood to follow different strategies confirm that the effect 
of the matching protocol on all of the considered strategies (best-responding, belief-
matching, collusion) is comparable under the BASE and CALCULATOR conditions. In all 
three regressions presented in Table 3.4, the interaction dummy is far from being 
significant. Similarly, Table 3.7 in Appendix A (regression [III]) also reveals that when 
measured with the average investments, there is no significant difference-in-differences. 
This means that the effects of the matching protocol are not only quantitatively similar 
across different informational conditions (BASE vs CALCULATOR), but also the 
magnitudes of these effects are similar. This speaks against any interplay between the 
effects of matching protocol and the saliency of best responses. 
 
Table 3.4: Treatment effects on the frequency of following different strategies. Panel probit 
regression. 
Dependent variable: 
1[Investment 
= best response] 
[I] 
1[Investment 
= belief] 
[II] 
1[Investment 
= collusive behavior] 
[III] 
1[Stranger protocol] -0.274 -0.101 -4.378** 
 (0.330) (0.397) (2.125) 
1[Calculator] 1.423*** 0.192 -0.771 
 (0.211) (0.173) (1.760) 
1[Stranger] x 1[Calculator] 0.221 -0.283 0.023 
 (0.383) (0.221) (2.861) 
Constant -2.393*** -1.381*** -4.256*** 
 (0.166) (0.322) (1.286) 
Number of observations 7080 7080 7080 
Number of clusters 78 78 78 
Wald Chi-squared 105.17*** 8.75** 79.09*** 
Notes: Panel probit regression with random subject effects. In parentheses, robust standard errors 
clustered at independent observations. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Result 3.4: We fail to reject the null hypothesis 3.3. The matching protocol induces 
similar effects under a low (BASE) and high (CALCULATOR) saliency of best responses. 
 
3.5.4. The effect of limited computational abilities 
We compare behavior in two STRANGER treatments to test whether providing 
direct hints at best responses helps to follow this strategy. Panels B of Tables 3.2 and 
3.3 demonstrate that the fraction of best responses indeed increases from 2.4% to 22.1%. 
The difference is highly significant (p<0.001, FP test). Although the effect is large – best 
responses become nine times more likely – the magnitude is lower than one could 
expect. In STRANGER_CALCULATOR, despite being provided with information 
concerning the best response, in more than three-quarters of cases subjects decided not 
to best-respond. Therefore, computational limitations are one important obstacles in 
playing best responses, albeit probably not the only one. 
 
Result 3.5: We reject the null hypothesis 3.4. In STRANGER_CALCULATOR, best responses 
are significantly more frequent than in STRANGER_BASE, whereby their fraction rises 
from 2.4% to 22.1%. 
Additionally, the probit regression [I] in Table 3.4 confirms that the 
computational tool significantly increases best-responding. The effect is not only present 
in the STRANGER condition, but also among partners. The scales of the effect under both 
conditions are strikingly similar (see panels A of Tables 3.2 and 3.3). 
We also investigate whether a lower-than-expected fraction of best responses in 
CALCULATOR treatments is due to the fact that subjects need time to recognize which 
strategy to follow. Figure 3.9 in Appendix A depicts the structure of decisions in 
treatments with the computational tool over time. It becomes clear that the share of best 
responses remains at about 20% throughout the course of the experiment. We cannot 
identify any time trends.  
Finally, we analyze how the increased fractions of best responses impact on the 
response function to beliefs in CALCULATOR treatments. Panels C and D of Figure 3.8 in 
Appendix A shows that the empirical response function remains linear, albeit with a 
slightly lower slope than 45 degrees. The effect of more common best responses is too 
weak to induce a response function resembling the theoretic prediction.   
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Table 3.5: Adjustment models: regression analysis of period-by-period adjustments. 
A. BASE treatments 
Dependent variable  
Inv(t) - Inv(t-1) 
PARTNER 
_BASE 
[I] 
PARTNER 
_BASE 
[II] 
STRANGER 
_BASE 
[I] 
STRANGER 
_BASE 
[II] 
     
Best response(t) - Inv(t-1) 0.424*** 0.181*** 0.145* 0.149** 
 (0.109) (0.049) (0.082) (0.060) 
Matching(t) - Inv(t-1) 0.434*** 0.389*** 0.326*** 0.327*** 
 (0.058) (0.083) (0.057) (0.062) 
Max_win_prob(t) - Inv(t-1) -0.263***  0.005  
 (0.084)  (0.050)  
Constant 23.874*** 2.874*** 1.830 2.214** 
 (7.074) (1.004) (3.762) (1.029) 
Number of observations 1682 1682 1740 1740 
Number of clusters 29 29 10 10 
Wald Chi-squared 128.13*** 46.84*** 117.43*** 98.29*** 
     
B. CALCULATOR 
treatments 
Dependent variable  
Inv(t) - Inv(t-1) 
PARTNER_ 
CALCULATOR 
[I] 
PARTNER_ 
CALCULATOR 
[II] 
STRANGER 
_CALCULATOR 
[I] 
STRANGER 
_CALCULATOR 
[II] 
     
Best response(t) - Inv(t-1) 0.332*** 0.323*** -0.051 0.222*** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.207) (0.037) 
Matching(t) - Inv(t-1) 0.403*** 0.402*** 0.243*** 0.287*** 
 (0.084) (0.080) (0.068) (0.074) 
Max_win_prob(t) - Inv(t-1) -0.010  0.321  
 (0.034)  (0.240)  
Constant 2.480 1.691** -21.871 2.302*** 
 (2.363) (0.736) (17.929) (0.580) 
Number of observations 1682 1682 1740 1740 
Number of clusters 29 29 10 10 
Wald Chi-squared 275.19*** 171.93*** 45.81*** 47.56*** 
Notes: Panel regressions with random subject effects. In parentheses, robust standard errors clustered at 
independent observations. Due to a relatively small number of clusters in STRANGER treatments, as a 
robustness check for those treatments we also estimate regressions with cluster-bootstrapped standard 
errors (see Cameron et al. 2008). The inference does not change qualitatively. In particular, 
insignificant regressors are also insignificant with the bootstrapping method. Significance levels:  
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.   
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3.5.5. What if not best responses? 
We find that in CALCULATOR treatments best responses are not played very often. 
Therefore, the question arises: what do subjects play instead? As is typical of 
experiments on rent-seeking behavior, we deal with a large behavioral variation. 
Nevertheless, we attempt to organize the data to identify average tendencies. We use the 
adjustment models that follow the approach by Huck et al. (1999) as well as Fallucchi 
et al. (2013). We investigate which of the three strategies proposed in CALCULATOR 
treatment most strongly drives period-by-period adjustments. The results are reported in 
Table 3.5. In regression specifications [I] we use all three displayed strategies. It 
becomes apparent that maximizing the expected winning probability (i.e., investing the 
entire endowment) is either not significant or has a negative effect, which is difficult to 
interpret. Hence, we also estimate alternative specifications [II], using only two other 
behavioral rules as predictors (best responses and matching beliefs) and interpret these 
results. In all treatments, both behavioral rules have a significant impact on the observed 
investments. Moreover, in all treatments the absolute magnitude of matching beliefs is 
larger than the absolute magnitude of playing best response. However, the parametric 
comparison of regression parameters reveals that the differences are statistically 
insignificant.27 Therefore, we can conclude that both playing best responses and 
matching beliefs drive contest behavior in our experiment significantly and to a similar 
extend. On average subjects tend to choose investments in between best-reply and 
matching beliefs. 
 
3.6. Discussion and conclusion 
We conduct a new series of experiments on rent-seeking in symmetric two-player 
contests to test the effect of the matching protocol on investment behavior in repeated 
interactions. Much previous work in behavioral and experimental economics leads us to 
expect a behavioral effect of the matching protocol. Surprisingly, our results provide 
clear evidence that the matching protocol has no effect on average bidding behavior, nor 
the willingness to play best responses. Accordingly, we can reject strategic motives 
induced by repeated interactions with the same opponent as an explanation for subjects 
                                                          
27 Only in PARTNER_BASE treatment is the difference significant at 10 percent. 
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not best-responding in experimental contests. Manipulation of the matching protocol 
triggers only one noteworthy behavioral difference, whereby we observe somehow more 
collusive behavior among partners rather than strangers. However, the scale of collusion 
remains relatively small and it does not induce differences detectable at the level of 
average investments or the empirical response function.  
Our results confirm the conclusion following from Sheremeta’s (2013) meta-
analysis and complement mixed previous evidence on this question. The study provides 
guidelines for both researchers investigating contest behavior in the lab as well as contest 
designers. On the one hand, we show that the effect of the matching protocol in rent-
seeking experiments is not too large and often negligible. On the other hand, we 
demonstrate that the danger of collusive behavior between contestants facing each other 
repeatedly is only moderate. We observe little collusion between two players, which 
leads us to expect that such behavior would be even more unlikely if we increased the 
number of contestants (Huck et al. 2004). Moreover, the result of no strategic motives 
behind non-best-responding is robust against our experimental variation of a low or high 
saliency of best responses. 
We report evidence that limited computational abilities prevent subjects from 
best-responding. We find that making best responses extremely salient increases 
subjects’ willingness to play them. However, the effect is smaller than one could expect 
(the frequency of best responses increases to 20 percent). This result holds to the almost 
exact extent and magnitude under both tested matching protocols. Moreover, our 
experimental design in which we provide subjects with three possible investments and 
not only with a hint at best responses allows us to argue that the effect is not driven by 
the experimenter demand effect. When exposed to three proposals, we would expect 
subjects to feel obliged to follow them to a similar extent. However, we find that the 
presence of the tool does not raise the likelihood of matching beliefs or maximizing the 
winning probability. This suggests that the increased willingness to follow best 
responses in CALCULATOR treatments is not due to the experimenter demand effect; 
instead, bounded rationality and severe difficulties in identifying best responses seem to 
be the most likely reasons. In this sense, our results complement conclusions from 
Masiliunas et al.’s (2014) work.  
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3.7. Appendix A. Additional tables and figures 
 
 
Table 3.6: Summary statistics of investment behavior across treatments. 
Treatment 
Average 
investment 
Standard 
deviation 
H0: Investment  
= 
Nash equilibrium 
PARTNER_BASE 34.724 28.885 p=0.023 
STRANGER_BASE 38.014 24.523 p=0.008 
PARTNER_CALCULATOR 28.421 18.347 p=0.127 
STRANGER_CALCULATOR 33.613 18.467 p=0.002 
Note: In the last column, we test the null hypothesis of the investments being 
 at the Nash equilibrium level. We report p-values from a two-sided Fisher-Pitman  
permutation test conducted at the level of independent observations. 
 
Table 3.7: Treatment effects on bidding behavior. Panel regression analysis.  
Dependent variable: 
Investment 
BASE 
treatments 
[I] 
CALCULATOR 
treatments 
[II] 
all  
treatments 
[III] 
1[Stranger protocol] 3.291 5.192* 3.291 
 (6.032) (2.836) (5.993) 
1[Calculator]   -6.302 
   (4.532) 
1[Stranger protocol  
   x 1[Calculator]   
1.901 
   
(6.623) 
Constant 34.724*** 28.421*** 34.724*** 
 (4.018) (2.159) (3.992) 
Number of observations 3540 3540 7080 
Number of clusters 39 39 78 
Wald Chi-squared 0.30 3.35* 5.79 
Notes: Panel regression with random subject effects. In parentheses, robust standard  
errors clustered at independent observations. Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
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Figure 3.5: Average investments over time, plotted by treatment. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Distribution of investments across treatments. 
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Figure 3.7: Myopic beliefs across treatments. 
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Figure 3.8: Average responses to beliefs across treatments. 
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Figure 3.9: Structure of decisions in CALCULATOR treatments over time. 
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3.8. Appendix B. Decision screens and experimental instructions: 
PARTNER_CALCULATOR treatment 
Note: See Figure 3.1 in the main text for the decision screen. 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Feedback screen in PARTNER_CALCULATOR treatment. Translation from German. 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Contest result screen in PARTNER_CALCULATOR treatment. Translation from German.
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Instructions in PARTNER_CALCULATOR treatment (translation from 
German) 
General information 
Welcome to our experiment! It is important that you carefully read and understand the 
following instructions. If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will then come 
to you and answer it. Communication with other participants before and during the 
experiment is prohibited. If you violate this rule, you will have to leave the experiment 
and will not receive any payment. 
You can earn money in this experiment. You will receive 4 EUR for your participation. 
You can earn additional money during the experiment. The amount of money that you 
earn depends on your decisions and those of other participants in the experiment. Your 
earnings are denoted in tokens. These will be converted in EUR and paid out in cash at 
the end of the experiment. The exchange rate is: 
270 tokens = 1 EUR. 
The experiment comprises several rounds. Tokens that you earn in each round are added 
to your tokens account. Your payoff is the sum of the tokens that you have earned in all 
rounds of the experiment. No participant will receive information about your payoff in 
the experiment or your identity. 
Course of the experiment 
In today’s experiment you will interact with another participant. You will shortly be 
randomly matched with an opponent. In every pair there will be a player A (marked 
blue) and a player B (marked red). The roles are also randomly assigned. The pairings 
as well as the roles remain unchanged for the entire experiment. Information about your 
role will be displayed on the screen before the first round begins. 
The experiment comprises 30 rounds. All rounds proceed in the same way. 
In each round, you and your opponent will compete in a lottery for a prize. 
At the beginning of each round, you receive from us 100 tokens. Then, you can decide 
how many tokens you want to spend on lottery tickets. For one token, you can purchase 
one ticket (1 token = 1 ticket). You can purchase as many tickets as you want, but you 
 69 
3. On the Reluctance to Play Best Responses in Tullock Contests 
are not allowed to exceed your budget. Tokens that you do not spend on lottery tickets 
are added to your account. 
The prize that you can win in the lottery in each round is 100 tokens. 
Your chance of winning only depends on how many tickets you have bought and how 
many your opponent has bought. The more tickets you have bought, the more likely it 
is that you win. The more tickets your opponent has bought, the less likely it is that you 
win. The probabilities with which you win the prize are equal to the number of your 
tickets divided by the number of all tickets bought. This means that it is computed 
according to the following rule: 
Your probability of winning =  Number of your ticketsNumber of your tickets +   Number of opponent′s tickets  
 
Your earnings in a single round are as follows: 
Your earnings if you win = 100 – your investment in the tickets + 100 
Your earnings if you lose = 100 – your investment in the tickets  
If only one player has bought tickets, she/he wins with certainty. If neither of the players 
has bought any tickets, the lottery does not take place and nobody wins the prize. 
Each round comprises three steps: 
Step 1 (Decision) 
In the first step, you decide how many tickets you would like to purchase. At the same 
time, your opponent makes the same decision. 
Figure 1 shows the computer screen in step 1. The decision process takes place in two 
sub-steps.  
Sub-step 1 a (Your prediction about the opponent’s investment) 
First, you are asked what investment you expect from your opponent (see field (a) in 
Figure 1). Please insert your prediction and click “OK”. 
For your prediction, you can earn a bonus of maximal 20 tokens. The amount of the 
bonus depends on how good your prediction was. The smaller the mistake in your 
prediction, the higher your bonus.  
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The mistake is the difference between your prediction and actual opponent’s 
investment: 
Mistake = |Your prediction − actual opponentbs investment| 
The following table shows how large the bonus is: 
Mistake Bonus 
0 20 
1 19,5 
2 18 
3 15,5 
4 12 
5 7,5 
6 2 
larger than 6 0 
 
There is no negative bonus, whereby you cannot lose any tokens for your prediction. 
Sub-step 1b (Your investment) 
After you confirmed your prediction, field (b) appears on the screen (see Figure 1), 
where you are expected to insert your decision on your investment. The example in 
Figure 1 shows the screen if a player predicted that his/her competitor would invest 50 
tokens. 
Based upon your prediction is sub-step 1a, the computer calculates several proposals of 
how much you could invest. 
In every box 1-3 one proposal appears. The winning probability and your payoff if you 
win or lose after having followed the proposals are also displayed.  
Box 1 shows how much you need to invest in order to maximize your expected payoff, 
given your prediction about the opponent’s investment. 
The expected payoff is computed in the following way: 
 
 
Box 2 shows how much you need to invest to obtain the same expected payoff as your 
opponent (given your prediction about the opponent’s investment). 
Box 3 shows how much you need to invest to maximize your winning probability. 
Expected 
payoff 
= 
Payoff if 
you win 
X X Probability that 
you win 
+ Probability that 
you lose 
Payoff if you 
lose 
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In order to follow one of the proposals, simply click the red button at the bottom of the 
respective box. 
You are not obligated to follow any of the proposals; you may also invest any other 
number of tokens. You can do this using box 4. Please insert there your investment and 
confirm with the OK button. The corresponding winning probability and payoffs will be 
computed and appear on the screen. You can repeat this as many times as you want. You 
need to confirm your final decision with the “Confirm another decision” button. 
The time for your decision in every round is limited. In the first ten rounds, you have 90 
seconds time, in the next 20 rounds, 60 seconds. If you do not insert any prediction and 
decision within the given time, your investment in the round will be zero and you will 
receive no bonus.  
 
Step 2 (Feedback) 
In the second step, you receive feedback on the opponent’s decision; in other words, 
how many tickets she/he has bought. The probabilities of winning are also computed 
and displayed. All tickets bought are numerated. You receive information on which 
numbers correspond to your tickets and which to those of your opponent. In order to 
make it clearer, this is also displayed graphically.  
Each ticket is equally likely to be drawn. 
You also receive feedback concerning how good your prediction about your opponent’s 
investment was and how large your bonus is. 
 
Step 3 (Lottery drawing) 
In the last step, the winning ticket is drawn. The computer draws one of bought tickets. 
The number of the winning ticket and the winner are displayed on the screen, as are your 
earnings in the current round. 
[Subjects also received a screen shot of the decision stage mask, see Figure 3.1. The 
only difference is that we marked decision fields with red frames, as described in the 
instructions above.] 
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Chapter 4: 
PUSHING THE BAD AWAY: 
REVERSE TULLOCK CONTESTS 
 
Joint work with Bettina Rockenbach 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Situations of contest are ubiquitous. Under a number of circumstances, people 
compete against each other to obtain some profits or rents. As a result, a stream of 
literature on rent-seeking behavior has arisen (see e.g., Congleton et al. 2008a). Since 
field data on rent-seeking is hardly available, most economic research relies on 
experimental data (see e.g., Dechenaux et al. 2015). However, people not only compete 
against each other to achieve gains. We can think of numerous examples in which people 
exert efforts to avoid something bad coming or to avoid a loss. For instance, imagine 
that in the face of decreasing numbers of children in society at least one of the primary 
schools in a city needs to be closed. To avoid long travel times, different neighborhoods 
will start lobbying against closing their school. Similarly, imagine that two potential 
locations for a waste disposal have been identified and the government needs to decide 
which one to choose. Again, it is very likely that local communities will be ready and 
determined to spend resources to avoid their community being chosen. Even though 
rent-seeking contests for avoiding negative rents are common in practice, such settings 
have not been studied in the literature to date. We strive to close this gap by investigating 
whether contests to avoid the bad induce different behavior than ‘conventional’ contests 
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for achieving gains. In particular, we address the question whether contests for avoiding 
losses are fiercer than those for achieving gains.  
In our theoretical analysis, we introduce negative prizes into the framework of 
Tullock (1980) contests (henceforth called ‘reverse Tullock contests’) and show that 
such a variation does not alter the game-theoretic prediction under standard preferences. 
Nonetheless, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) predicts that behavior in 
reverse contests should be more aggressive because losses induce larger changes in 
utilities than corresponding gains. This suggests that contests for pushing the bad away 
lead to an even larger dissipation of resources than settings traditionally considered in 
the empirical and experimental research.  
Our data show that reverse Tullock contests generate on average 15 percent 
higher investments than conventional contests, although this effect is statistically 
insignificant. Thus, it seems that the insights on behavior in Tullock contests for 
achieving gains may serve as appropriate predictors for contests to avoid losses. 
 
4.2. The theoretical framework of reverse Tullock contests 
We consider Tullock (1980) contests between two symmetric players (called A 
and B). In the conventional contests, players with the initial wealth E compete for a 
single non-dividable prize V. Both players spend resources that determine their winning 
probabilities. If player A invests c and player B invests d, the winning probabilities 
are as follows: 
c = hihijhk ;       d = 1 − c (4.1) 
Therefore, th expected payoff for player  ∈ -f, 8 is: 
NO =  −  +  (4.2) 
In the reverse contest, contestants enjoy higher initial wealth (E+V). However, 
the prize is negative (−). Investments in the contest increase the probability of avoiding 
the negative prize (i.e., not being drawn as a recipient of the prize). Thus, player i’s 
probability of receiving the prize is equal to (1 − ). Hence, the expected payoff for 
player i is: NO =  +  −  − (1 − ) (4.3) 
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This can be re-written as: NO =  −  +  (4.4)  
Equations 4.2 and 4.4 show that - in expected terms - the contests are equivalent 
(see also Figure 4.1). Neither the best response function nor the equilibrium prediction 
change. In both conventional and reverse Tullock contests, the Nash equilibrium under 
standard preferences prescribes individual investments equal to clm = dlm = no 
(Szidarovsky and Okuguchi 1997). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The equivalence of the contests. 
 
Although the two considered contests are equivalent from the theoretical 
perspective and characterized by the same equilibrium prediction, there are reasons to 
expect different behavior across the two settings. Prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979, 1992) claims that people care more about losses than about gains; they 
are loss-averse. If the perceived value of a loss is larger than the perceived value of a 
monetarily equivalent gain, players competing to avoid a loss should be willing to invest 
more than contestants competing for a gain. This is because the equilibrium analysis 
predicts that a higher (perceived) stake of the contest drives more aggressive bidding 
behavior. Thus, loss aversion predicts that contests for avoiding losses are fiercer than 
those for achieving gains.1 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Loss aversion has been studied experimentally in a number of domains. Among others, the impact of 
loss aversion has been tested in a competitive environment other than Tullock contests. For instance, 
Delgado et al. (2008) show that framing an auction such that the losses become more prominent increases 
bidding prices. 
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4.3. Related literature 
Even though rent-seeking contests for avoiding losses are common in practice, 
such settings have not been studied in the experimental literature to date.2 Exploiting the 
difference between positive and negative domains has been particularly prominent in 
experimental literature on public goods provision. Andreoni (1995) shows that people 
are more willing to cooperate if the provision of a public good is framed positively. 
Similarly, Sonnemans et al. (1998) investigate whether behavior is different if 
cooperation leads to the provision of a public good versus the prevention of a public bad, 
finding that cooperative behavior is more common in a positive domain (public good 
provision). 
Our project is also related to a recent study by Hong et al. (2015), whose field 
experiment investigates the effects of framing monetary incentives as losses or gains on 
workers’ productivity in a team contest. The authors show that although the framing 
effect measured with the average productivity is statistically insignificant teams 
competing to avoid a loss are significantly more likely to win the contest. There are 
several major differences between Hong et al.’s study and ours. Unlike the authors, who 
test team behavior in tournament-styled contests, we investigate individual investments 
in Tullock contests. Moreover, in our study the prize is symmetrically framed as either 
achieving a gain or avoiding a loss for both contestants, whereas in Hong et al.’s study 
the framing was asymmetric (one team competed for a reward, another for avoiding a 
punishment).  
 
4.4. The experiment 
4.4.1. The experimental design 
In the experiment, the contest between two players is framed as a lottery with a 
positive or negative prize V. In the conventional contest, both players are endowed with 
E=20 tokens and compete for a positive prize V=20 tokens. In the reverse contest players 
with the initial wealth of E+V=40 tokens compete against each other to avoid being 
awarded a negative prize (V= -20 tokens). Players buy lottery tickets for one token each.  
                                                          
2 During the ‘Contest: Theory and Evidence’ conference in May 2016 in Norwich we became aware of a 
similar research project in progress: “Property Rights and Loss Aversion in Contests” by Chowdhury and 
Ramalingam. 
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The contest is repeated for 20 periods in partner matching. Each period proceeds 
in the same way and is payoff-relevant. First, subjects decide how many tokens from 
their endowment they want to spend on lottery tickets.3 At the same time, they report 
which investment they expect from the opponent. The guessing is incentivized, whereby 
subjects are paid according to a quadratic loss function between four and zero tokens.4 
On the decision stage, subjects are also provided with a what-if calculator, which 
computes winning probabilities and expected payoffs, given their belief about the 
opponent’s investment (see Figure 4.6 in Appendix B). In the second step, subjects 
receive feedback on the opponent’s decision, the resulting winning probabilities and the 
amount of bonus for the reported belief. In the third step, the computer draws one of the 
bought tickets and the winner achieves the gain (or avoids the loss). Both contestants 
receive information on their earnings in the current period. If both players do not buy 
any lottery tickets, the lottery is not conducted and nobody achieves a gain (or both 
players experience a loss).  
 
4.4.2. Treatments and hypothesis 
We study two different treatments: Treatment T0 is a conventional Tullock 
contest and treatment T1 is a reverse Tullock contest, i.e., the winner of the lottery avoids 
the negative prize.5 The treatments’ characteristics are summarized in Table 4.1. 
 
                                                          
3 Although endowments are different across treatments, we keep the strategy space unchanged. In both 
treatments, subjects are allowed to invest at most 20 tokens. This also prevents making losses in T1.  
4 The applied function is: max -0;  4 − 0.4(pqp − rstq upvswps)8. See Selten (1998) and 
Palfrey and Wang (2009) for the advantages of the quadratic rules against the linear ones. We are aware 
of the current discussion in the literature on whether and how to incentivize beliefs (e.g., Schlag et al. 
2015). 
5
 Note that one could implement the “avoiding the bad” condition in at least one alternative way. Rather 
than lobbying for oneself to avoid the bad, contestants could lobby for the opponent to receive the bad. In 
the experimental implementation, players do not buy lottery tickets for themselves, but rather for the 
opponent to increase the opponent’s chance of being drawn and hence receiving the negative prize. 
However, such an implementation has the drawback that in comparison to T0 it not only differs in the rent 
dimension. Additionally, in such an implementation, contestants do not want to win the contest, but rather 
they want the opponent to win. It has been shown that in Tullock contests, players experience some non-
monetary utility from the mere act of winning (Sheremeta 2010, 2013). This joy of winning is present in 
T0 and T1 alike. However, if contestants want the other player to win, they potentially lack the joy of 
winning and we may observe two counteracting effects as compared to T0: loss aversion drives higher 
investments, whereas reduced joy of winning lowers investments. For these reasons, we decided to 
predominantly focus on the implementation of the Tullock contest for avoiding the bad as in treatment 
T1. Nonetheless, we conducted the alternative implementation of buying lottery tickets for the opponent 
as a treatment T2. For details, see Appendix A. 
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of the experimental treatments. 
Treatment Endowment Prize Contest winner… 
T0 20 20 receives the positive prize  
T1 40 -20 avoids the negative prize 
 
As outlined in Section 4.2, we expect subjects to invest more aggressively in T1 
than in T0. 
 
Hypothesis: Reverse Tullock contests in treatment T1 generate higher investments than 
conventional Tullock contests in T0. 
 
 
4.4.3. Sample Size 
We use power calculations to determine the appropriate sample size for our 
study. Convention prescribes that an effect should be detectable at the 5 percent 
significance level with the power of 80 percent (i.e., 8 out of 10 times). To calculate the 
appropriate sample size we have to quantify the expected magnitude of the treatment 
effect and its variance. Since there are no previous studies on reverse Tullock contests, 
we try to come as close as possible by estimating the expected magnitude of the 
treatment effect from previous experiments using a positive and negative frame, albeit 
in a different context (public goods setting). Andreoni (1995) finds that the treatment 
effect between positive and negative framing of the public good provision is 50 percent. 
The author reports that the average cooperation rate increases from 16 percent in the 
negative frame to 34 percent in the positive frame (Andreoni 1995, pp. 7-8). Sonnemans 
et al. (1998) find that framing the game as public goods provision induces a cooperation 
rate of 51 percent, which is significantly more than the cooperation rate of 40 percent in 
the public bad prevention game. The treatment effect amounts to about 25 percent 
(Sonnemans et al. 1998, p. 149).  
It is well documented that experimental contests are characterized by large 
behavioral variation. The phenomenon is known in the literature as overspreading 
(Sheremeta 2013; Masiliunas et al. 2014; Chowdhury et al. 2014). Therefore, in our 
power calculation, we have to take into account the notion that the variation in the data 
from contest experiments is usually larger than in the mentioned public goods 
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experiments. To estimate the coefficient of variation (i.e., the ratio of standard deviation 
to mean), we rely on two prominent studies involving treatments with conventional 
Tullock contests under a similar experimental design to ours (e.g., repeated contest, two 
contestants, partner matching), namely Abbink et al. (2010) and Ahn et al. (2011). Table 
4.5 in Appendix B demonstrates that in both studies the coefficient of variation was very 
similar and amounted to about 36 percent. To be conservative, we assume the higher of 
the two values, namely 0.366. Based upon an expected treatment effect of 25 percent 
and a coefficient of variation of 0.366, we need 28 independent observations to detect a 
one-sided effect at the 5 percent level with the power of 81.02 percent. Thus, in order to 
have sufficient power we aimed to collect 28 independent observations (i.e., 56 subjects 
playing in a fixed partner matching) in each treatment. In T0 we have 28 independent 
observations and in T1 we collected 30 independent observations. Thus, our study has 
sufficient power to detect treatment differences at conventional levels. 
 
4.4.4. Procedure 
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic 
Research (CLER) in Cologne, Germany. Treatment T0 corresponds to treatment C1 
from the study reported in Chapter 2. In all treatments, subjects were recruited with 
ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and participated in only one session. The experiment was 
computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Experimental sessions lasted between 
60 and 75  minutes. Subjects (undergraduate and graduate students, 58% female, average 
age: 22.9)6 earned on average 15.6 EUR. 
 
4.5. Results 
In conventional Tullock contests (T0) subjects invest on average 6.855 tokens, 
which is significantly more than the Nash equilibrium level of 5 (p=0.002, one-sided 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test).7 As expected subjects invest on average more when 
competing to avoid a loss (T1) than when the winner receives a gain (see Figure 4.2). In 
T1 subjects invest on average 7.882, which is 15 percent more than in the baseline (T0). 
                                                          
6 Missing information on one subject (self-reports were voluntary).  
7 A pair of subjects over 20 periods constitutes one independent observation.  
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However, the difference is not statistically significant (p=0.173, one-sided Mann-
Whitney U-test).8 
Figure 4.2: Average investments over time. 
 
Table 4.2: Regression analysis.  
Dependent variable:  
Investment 
[I] [II] 
Belief 0.403***  
 (0.053)  
Period -0.020  
 (0.017)  
1[T1] 0.638 1.027 
 (0.505) (0.827) 
Constant 4.142*** 6.855*** 
 (0.563) (0.526) 
Number of observations 2319 2319 
Number of clusters 58 58 
Overall R-squared 0.286 0.011 
Notes: Panel regression with random subject effects. In parentheses, robust standard 
 errors clustered at independent observations. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
                                                          
8 The difference is also not significant for periods 5-20 (p=0.119, one-sided MWU-test), periods 10-20 
(p=0.123, one-sided MWU-test) and periods 15-20 (p=0.239, one-sided MWU-test). 
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Result: Investments in reverse contests in T1 are on average higher than in conventional 
Tullock contests (T0). However, the difference is not statistically significant. We reject 
our hypothesis.  
 
Our result is confirmed by the insignificant treatment differences in the 
parametric regression analysis presented in Table 4.2. Moreover, in several other 
dimensions, the behavior across the two treatments is fairly similar. The distribution of 
investments (see Figures 4.4 in Appendix B) as well as the pattern of belief-matching 
(see Figures 4.5 in Appendix B) are also similar to those in conventional contests. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
We are the first to study Tullock contests for avoiding a loss. Prospect theory and 
results from experiments comparing positive and negative framings suggest that 
investments in contests for avoiding losses are higher than in contests for achieving 
gains. Indeed, we find that contests for avoiding losses are fiercer, although the effect is 
statistically not significant. Thus, it seems that behavior in contests for achieving gains 
may be an appropriate predictor for contests for avoiding losses.   
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4.7. Appendix A. Additional treatment T2 
An alternative way of implementing the “avoiding the bad” condition would be that 
rather than lobbying for oneself to avoid the bad, contestants could lobby for the 
opponent to receive the bad. In the experimental implementation, players buy lottery 
tickets not for themselves, but rather for the opponent to increase the opponent’s chance 
of being drawn and hence receiving the loss. However, such an implementation has the 
drawback that in comparison to T0 it not only differs in the rent dimension. Additionally, 
in such an implementation, contestants do not want to win the contest, but rather they 
want the opponent to win. It has been shown that in Tullock contests, players experience 
some non-monetary utility from the mere act of winning (Sheremeta 2010, 2013). This 
joy of winning is present in T0 and T1 alike. However, if contestants want the other 
player to win, they potentially lack the joy of winning and we may observe two 
counteracting effects as compared to T0: loss aversion drives higher investments, 
whereas reduced joy of winning lowers investments. For these reasons we decided to 
predominantly focus on the implementation of the Tullock contest for avoiding the bad 
as in treatment T1. Nonetheless, we conducted the alternative implementation of buying 
lottery tickets for the opponent as a treatment T2 (see Table 4.3). As expected, the 
average investments in T2 are slightly larger than in T0 but smaller than in T1 (see 
Figure 4.3), although the differences are not significant (see Table 4.4). 
 
Table 4.3: Differences in the framing of the reverse contest. 
Treatment Endowment Prize 
Players buy lottery 
tickets for… 
Contest 
winner 
T1 40 -20 themselves avoids prize  
T2 40 -20 the opponent receives prize  
 
Table 4.4: Average investments across treatments. 
Treatment 
No of independent 
observations 
Average investment 
Investment  
difference to T2 
T0 28 6.855 p=0.438 
T1 30 7.882 p=0.210 
T2 30 7.184 n.a. 
Note: In the last column, p-values from the one-sided MWU-test for the null hypothesis  
that investments in T2 are equal to investments in the corresponding treatment. 
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Figure 4.3: Average investments over time (with the control treatment T2). 
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4.8. Appendix B. Additional tables and figures 
 
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics of behavior in benchmark studies. 
Study 
(1) 
Ind. Obs. 
(2) 
Mean  
(3) 
St. Dev. 
Coefficient  
of variaton 
(2)/(3) 
Abbink et al. (AER 
2010): 
treatment 1:1 
14 512.96 184.94 0.3605 
Ahn et al. (IJIO 2011): 
Baseline treatment 
16 336.93 123.21 0.3657 
Notes: Data from Abbink et al.’s study is publicly available under  
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.100.1.420.  
Data from Ahn et al.’s study was kindly provided by Tim C. Salmon. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Distribution of investments across treatments. 
Note: Corrected p-values from the exact Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distributions (at 
the level of independent observations): T0 vs T1: p=0.167; T0 vs T2: p=0.676; T1 vs T2: p=0.536. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Distribution of Belief-Investment-ratio across treatments. 
Notes: Ratio=investment / reported belief. Values are censored at 5. We present cases, in which beliefs 
equal zero as 5 (since the ratio cannot be computed). 
Corrected p-values from the exact Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distributions (at the 
level of independent observations): T0 vs T1: p=0.911; T0 vs T2: p=0.890; T1 vs T2: p=0.958. 
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Figure 4.6: Decision screen in treatment T1 (also part of the written instructions to subjects). 
Translation from German.  
  
 85 
4. Pushing the Bad Away: Reverse Tullock Contests 
4.9. Appendix C. Experimental instructions. Treatment T1 
(translation from German) 
 
Note: We report in the following the instructions for treatment T1, of which the 
instructions to T0 and T2 are straightforward variations. In the text, we only indicate the 
differences in the framing of the prize, as the remaining discrepancies are minor. 
Original instructions are available upon request.  
 
General information 
Welcome to our experiment! It is important that you carefully read and understand the 
following instructions. If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will then come 
to you and answer it. Communication with other participants before and during the 
experiment is prohibited. If you violate this rule, you will have to leave the experiment 
and will not receive any payment. 
You can earn money in this experiment. You will receive 4.00 EUR for your 
participation. You can earn additional money during the experiment. The amount of 
money that you earn depends on your decisions and the those of other participants in the 
experiment. Your earnings are denoted in tokens. These will be converted into EUR and 
paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate is: 
40 tokens = 1 EUR. 
The experiment comprises several rounds. Tokens that you earn in each round are added 
to your tokens account. Your payoff is the sum of the tokens that you have earned in all 
rounds of the experiment. No participant will receive information about your payoff in 
the experiment or your identity. 
Course of the experiment 
In today’s experiment, you will interact with another participant. You will shortly be 
randomly matched with an opponent. In every pair, there will be a player A (marked 
blue) and a player B (marked red). The roles are also randomly assigned. The pairings 
as well as the roles remain unchanged for the entire experiment. Information about your 
role will be displayed on the screen before the first round begins. 
 86 
4. Pushing the Bad Away: Reverse Tullock Contests 
The experiment comprises 20 rounds. All rounds proceed in the same way. 
In each round, you and your opponent will compete in a lottery. 
At the beginning of each round, you receive from us an endowment of 40 tokens. Then, 
you can decide how many tokens you want to spend on lottery tickets. For one token, 
you can purchase one ticket (1 token = 1 ticket). You can purchase as many tickets as 
you want. However, you are not allowed to spend more than 20 tokens in a single round. 
Tokens that you do not spend on lottery tickets are added to your account. 
[T1: The lottery decides who in a given round gets 20 points deducted from the 
endowment. If one of your tickets is drawn, you avoid the deduction.] 
[T0: The prize that you can win in the lottery in each round is 20 tokens.] 
[T2: The lottery decides who in a given round gets 20 points deducted from the 
endowment and you buy the lottery tickets “for your opponent” (tickets of the 
opponent’s color). This means that if you are player A (blue) you buy red tickets, and if 
you are player B (red) you buy blue tickets. If a ticket of your color is drawn, you are 
deducted 20 points.] 
Your chance of avoiding the deduction depends solely on how many tickets you have 
bought and how many your opponent has bought. The more tickets you have bought, the 
more likely it is that you will avoid the deduction. The more tickets your opponent has 
bought, the less likely it is that you will avoid the deduction. The probability with which 
you avoid the deduction is equal to the number of your tickets divided by the number of 
all tickets bought. This means that it is computed according to the following rule: 
Probability of avoiding deduction =  Number of your ticketsNumber of your tickets +   Number of opponent′s tickets  
 
Your earnings in a single round are as follows: 
Your earnings if you win the lottery= 40 – your investment in the tickets 
Your earnings if you lose the lottery = 40 – your investment in the tickets – 20  
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If only one player has bought tickets, she/he wins with certainty and her/his opponent is 
deducted the 20 tokens. If neither of the players has bought any tickets, the lottery does 
not take place and both players get the deduction. 
 
Each round comprises three steps: 
Step 1 
In the first step, you decide how many tickets you would like to purchase. At the same 
time, your opponent makes the same decision. 
While you make your decision, you can use a what-if calculator. You can insert a 
hypothetical investment by your opponent and the calculator computes the probabilities 
of avoiding and obtaining the deduction and corresponding payoffs, subject to your 
investment. The expected payoff is also computed.  
The expected payoff is computed in the following way: 
 
 
You can use the calculator as often as you want. Please simply insert a value in the field 
of the opponent’s investment and click on “Compute” (see red field (1) in Figure 1). 
The example in Figure 1 shows the what-if-calculator for a hypothetical investment of 
10. For instance, you can see in the table that if you invest 2 tokens, your probability of 
avoiding the deduction is 16.67%, whereby your payoff will amount then to 38 tokens. 
You will lose the lottery and obtain the deduction with the probability of 83.33%. In 
such a case, your payoff will be 18 tokens. Your expected payoff will be 21.33 tokens. 
For example, if you invest 19 tokens, you will win the lottery and achieve a payoff of 
21 tokens with a probability of 65.52%, while will lose and achieve a payoff of 1 token 
with a probability of 34.48%. Your expected payoff will be 14.10 tokens.  
In every round you should insert within the given time your final decision in the fields 
on the right-hand side of the screen and confirm with the “OK” button (see red field (2) 
in Figure 1). You are not only asked about your investment, but also what investment 
Expected 
payoff = 
Payoff 
without 
deduction 
X X 
Probability that 
you avoid 
deduction 
+ 
Probability that 
you obtain 
deduction 
Payoff after 
deduction 
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you expect from your opponent. For this you can earn a bonus of maximal 4 tokens. The 
amount of the bonus depends on how good your prediction was. The smaller the mistake 
in your prediction, the higher your bonus. The bonus is computed in the following way. 
Bonus = 4 − 0.4 ∗ Mistake 
The mistake is the difference between your prediction and actual opponent’s 
investment: 
Mistake = |Your prediction − actual opponentbs investment| 
If the mistake is larger than 3, the bonus is 0. This means that there is no negative bonus, 
whereby you cannot lose any tokens for your prediction. 
The time for your decision in every round is limited. In the first ten rounds you have 3 
minutes time, in the next 10 rounds 2 minutes. If you do not insert any values within the 
given time, your investment in the round will be zero and you will not receive any bonus 
for your prediction. 
 
Step 2 
In the second step, you receive feedback on the opponent’s decision, in other words, 
how many tickets she/he has bought. The probabilities of winning are also computed 
and displayed. All tickets bought are numerated. You receive information on which 
numbers correspond to your tickets and which to those of your opponent. In order to 
make it clearer, this is also displayed graphically.  
Each ticket is equally likely to be drawn. 
You also receive feedback concerning how good your prediction about your opponent’s 
investment was and how large your bonus is. 
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Step 3 
In the last step, the winning ticket is drawn. The computer draws one of the bought 
tickets. The number of the winning ticket and the information about who is awarded a 
deduction are displayed on the screen, as are your earnings in the current round. 
 
[Subjects also received a screen shot of the decision stage mask, see Figure 4.6. The 
only difference is that we marked decision fields with red frames, as described in the 
instructions above.] 
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Chapter 5: 
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECT  
OF GROUP IDENTITY  
IN COLLECTIVE RENT-SEEKING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Rent-seeking behavior, ubiquitous in many areas of economics, has usually been 
studied experimentally using the framework of a lottery contest (Tullock 1980; 
Dechenaux et al. 2015). Although rent-seeking behavior is not only pursued by 
individuals but also by groups (e.g., firms or political parties), collective rent-seeking 
has only recently gained attention in experimental economics. Abbink et al. (2010) 
provide the first experimental evidence on contests between teams and compare 
individual and group behavior in Tullock contests. They find that groups do not suffer 
from free-riding problems as much as predicted by game theory and therefore overinvest 
more than single players do. In addition, within teams subjects exhibit substantial and 
persistent heterogeneity in behavior. While some recent studies provide new 
experimental results on collective Tullock contests (e.g., Ahn et al. 2011; Cason et al. 
2012, Leibbrandt and Sääksvouri 2012; see recent survey by Sheremeta 2015b), none of 
them addresses the puzzle of large behavioral heterogeneity within teams. To close this 
gap, in a new experiment I replicate Abbink et al. (2010)’s finding of substantial 
heterogeneity within teams and show that this is explained by the degree to which 
individuals identify with others in their group. 
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5.2. Related literature 
My study relates to several streams of literature in economics and social 
psychology. I study behavior in collective rent-seeking. Theoretical literature on rent-
seeking contests between groups was started by Katz et al. (1990) and Nitzan (1991). 
Experimental investigation on collective rent-seeking (pioneered by Abbink et al. 2010) 
is relatively new and recently summarized by Sheremeta (2015b). 
Since I investigate the effect of group identity, this paper contributes also to the 
psychological and economic literature on group identity and group behavior. Due to its 
long tradition of research on groups, social psychology has profound understanding of 
how group identity emerges and how it changes individual behavior. Experimental 
evidence from the 1970s (e.g., Tajfel et al. 1971) fueled the development of social 
identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) that remains a cornerstone of modern research 
on group behavior. However, psychologists only rarely consider environments involving 
a tension between the self-interest and the interest of others.1 For that reason, recent 
economic investigation of group identity complements previous psychological findings. 
Since Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) theoretical work that introduced the notion of group 
identity into economics, much experimental evidence on economic implications of 
group identity has been collected. Among others, social identity has been shown to alter 
cooperative behavior (e.g., Eckel and Grossman 2005), social preferences (e.g., Chen 
and Li 2009), coordination behavior (e.g., Chen and Chen 2011), trust and 
trustworthiness (e.g., Heap and Zizzo 2009), or willingness to punish others (e.g., Goette 
et al. 2012). Less attention has been devoted to groups in competitive environments and 
this is where my study makes a contribution. 
 
5.3. The experimental design 
Katz et al. (1990) extend Tullock’s model by introducing groups as contestants 
and the prize being a public good.2 I implement the set-up by Katz et al. and largely 
follow the design of Abbink et al. (2010). 
                                                          
1 Research by Gary Bornstein constitutes an important exception (Bornstein 1992, 2003, Kugler and 
Bornstein 2013). Bornstein experimentally investigated behavior in so-called team games (Bornstein 
2008). However, he did not pay much attention to the group identification process itself. 
2 Note that the prize exhibits public good properties only within a group, i.e., in the case of winning all 
group members receive the same monetary gain. Excludability of non-members is, however, possible 
(Esteban and Ray 2001, p. 664). 
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5.3.1.  The experimental set-up 
In the experiment, randomly created pairs of five player groups (labelled A, B, 
etc.) play a Tullock contest for T=20 rounds. The composition of groups as well as the 
pairing of competing parties are fixed throughout the entire experiment. Each round has 
the same structure and proceeds in three steps. 
At the beginning, each subject i is endowed with 1,000 points and decides how 
many of these she wants to spend on lottery tickets for her group k. One point 
corresponds to one ticket. All players make their decisions simultaneously and then 
feedback is given in two steps. First, the subject learns the aggregated (yz = ∑ ,z ) and 
average (
| yz) investments for her team, as well as the aggregated investment of the 
opposing team (y>z). The probabilities of winning for each team resulting from the 
lottery ticket investments are represented graphically on the screen. Second, the result 
of the lottery contest is presented. The computer randomly picks one of the lottery tickets 
and the group that owns it wins the prize. Subjects’ payoffs in the current round are also 
computed and displayed. After that, the experiment proceeds to the next round. The prize 
(V) is fixed at 1,000 points and does not depend on the number of tickets purchased. If 
neither of the competing groups buys any tickets, however, the lottery is not conducted 
and neither team wins the prize. The expected payoff of subject i belonging to group k 
is:  
(,z) = 1000 − ,z + yzyz + y>z  1000 (5.1) 
 
5.3.2. Hypotheses 
I hypothesize that although not directly induced, group identity arises 
spontaneously in experimental collective contests, facilitated by the between-team 
competition (Eckel and Grossman 2005) and the elements of payoff commonality 
(“either we all win the prize, or none of us”, see Brewer and Kramer 1986). The strength 
of the group attachment may vary from subject to subject, however, not only across but 
also within teams. 
Social group theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) recognizes social comparison as a 
crucial element of the group identification process. Groups seek for positive 
distinctiveness that should justify or legitimize their existence. In order to accomplish 
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this goal, they are willing to compete against out-groups (Turner 1975). In the course of 
the so-called social competition, groups compete for some scarce resources that have no 
value outside of the context of competition, e.g., rank, status, prestige of winning (Tajfel 
1982). In experimental contests, winning the prize is a natural device of building positive 
distinctiveness of a group against out-groups. This means that winning itself becomes 
important. Therefore, I expect subjects who more strongly identify with their teams to 
invest more than subjects who do not report strong attachment to their teams. 
 
5.3.3. Procedure 
The experiment was computerized and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 
2007). I conducted three sessions in October 2014. Ninety subjects (mostly students with 
various majors, average age: 24.7; 55.1% female3) were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner 
2015) and earned on average 11.30 EUR. The subjects received written instructions, 
which were also read aloud (see Appendix A). Each session lasted about 45 minutes. I 
collected data on the decisions of 18 teams of five players, i.e., nine independent 
observations. 
 
5.4. Results 
In equilibrium, a group should invest a total of V/4 (i.e., 250 points in this 
experiment) regardless of the group’s size. Abbink et al. (2010) find that teams invest 
more than the Nash equilibrium predicts. In their experiment, teams of four invest on 
average 1,035 points. Similarly in my experiment, teams of five also strongly overinvest. 
The average team contribution is 920 points, which is almost four times as much as in 
equilibrium. I focus, however, on another striking behavioral pattern. Like Abbink et al. 
(2010, pp. 431-432), I find substantial behavioral heterogeneity within teams.  
For each team and each period, I identify players contributing the most and the 
least to the team investment. As presented in Figure 5.1, the behavioral heterogeneity is 
not only large but also very persistent. Top contributors invest on average 402.3 points 
in each round (390.9 in the last five rounds), whereas lowest contributors tend to free-
ride on their peers from the beginning on and invest on average only 30.9 points (15.9 
                                                          
3 One subject did not report her/his gender. 
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in the last five rounds). Moreover, top contributors lower their investments only in the 
initial rounds and keep investing twice as much as the average investment (184.0) until 
the end of the experiment. In general, I observe little convergence in behavior within 
teams. Similar to Abbink et al. (p. 432), I conclude that some individuals behave as 
activists and remain so throughout the experiment. 
 
 Figure 5.1: Individual investment behavior and within-group heterogeneity. 
 
To examine the reasons for this persistent behavioral heterogeneity, subjects 
filled out a questionnaire about their motives and behavior in the experiment. One of the 
questions concerned group attachment: “Please state your opinion on a scale from 1 (do 
not agree at all) to 7 (totally agree): In the experiment, I experienced a strong sense of 
a team spirit”. Eighty-nine out of 90 subjects responded to this question. The following 
analysis is based on data from these 89 subjects. 
I classify answers into three categories: 1-2 = no identification; 3-5 = weak 
identification; 6-7 = strong identification. Figure 5.2 depicts mean investments of 
subjects that reported a similar level of group identification. There is a clear pattern: The 
stronger the degree of group attachment the higher the investment in the lottery. 
Behavior of subjects from different groups cannot be directly compared, since they were 
engaged in contests with different dynamics and hence different levels of investments. 
Therefore, I average investments of subjects from the same team, exhibiting similar 
levels of group identification (none, weak, strong). I non-parametrically compare 
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pairwise behavior between the three categories at the group level using a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test (WSR-test). All differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. The same significance levels hold if we only consider the data from the last five 
periods.  
The significant effect of group identification is confirmed in a parametric 
regression analysis. As 15.6 percent of the observations show zero investments, I 
estimate Tobit models censored at zero. I consider two specifications (see Table 5.1). In 
model [I], I follow the previously discussed classification of subjects into three 
categories. The group identity effect is captured with two dummies that correspond to 
the conditions of weak and strong group identification (hence, no group identification is 
the reference category). Since such an approach is prone to degrees of freedom in 
specifying the categories, I also test an alternative model [II] that does not involve any 
categorization, but treats team identity as a continuous variable. Regardless of how the 
group identity regressor is defined, its effect remains both statistically significant at the 
5 percent level and sizeable. In model [I], a weak group identification induces an average 
increase in investments of about 52 points. Strong group identification leads to an 
Figure 5.2: Group identity and average investment behavior. 
Notes: Asterisks correspond to results of WSR-test (two-tailed) at the group level. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05. 
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average increase of 79.5 points relative to the reference category, corresponding to 43.2 
percent of the mean investment in the experiment. 
 
Table 5.1: Regression analysis (Tobit models). 
Dependent variable:  
Individual investment(t) [I] [II] 
      
Own investment(t-1) 0.508*** 0.512*** 
 (0.057) (0.061) 
Team investment(t-1) -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.026) (0.027) 
Competitor investment(t-1) 0.066*** 0.065*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
1[Team identity weak] 52.383**  
 (21.892)  
1[Team identity strong] 79.453**  
 (28.595)  
Team identity   14.891** 
  (5.399) 
1[Lost(t-1)] -1.722 -1.617 
 (8.399) (8.496) 
Period -0.425 -0.418 
 (0.573) (0.576) 
Constant -8.000 -21.720 
 (26.921) (30.263) 
   
Observations 1691 1691 
No. of subjects 89 89 
Pseudo-R2 0.028 0.027 
 
Notes: Tobit models censored at 0. In parentheses, robust standard errors clustered 
on cohorts (pairs of teams). Significance levels: *** p<0.01,   ** p<0.05. 
 
The focus of the analysis is on the behavioral heterogeneity and not on the 
overinvesting. Nevertheless, the effect of group identity also helps to explain the latter 
phenomenon.4 In equilibrium, two opposite effects of the group size just offset each 
other. On the one hand, the increasing size of the group induces stronger free-riding and 
hence lowers individual investments. On the other hand, it leads to a higher total 
                                                          
4 Here, my evidence is complementary to the study on parochial altruism in collective contests by Abbink 
et al. (2012). 
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investment. Since group identity has been shown to reduce the free-riding incentive 
(Eckel and Grossman 2005), subjects identifying themselves with groups tend to invest 
more than game theory predicts. Despite its significant role, observed group identity is 
fairly weak as teams are randomly created and team members have no prior connection 
to one another. Real groups or organizations would be expected to display higher levels 
of identification, leading to even stronger overinvestment.5 Moreover, depending on the 
context, rent-seeking may be perceived as wasteful from a social viewpoint. If this is the 
case, group identity has a welfare-decreasing effect as it drives higher investments. This 
is in stark contrast to previous results on welfare-enhancing effects of group 
identification.  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I show that group identity and its heterogeneous effect among 
subjects help to explain strong and persistent heterogeneity in behavior within groups 
engaged in experimental contests. The overall effect of group identity also rationalizes 
reported substantial overbidding. I demonstrate that subjects very differently respond to 
the same experimental conditions, which prevents the experimenter from maintaining 
control over the saliency of collective identities in the lab. This echoes the conclusions 
by Riener and Wiederhold (2013), who stress the importance of manipulation checks 
when inducing group identities under laboratory conditions. My results complement 
their findings by stating that such checks are also important in experiments in which 
group identity can arise endogenously and is not exogenously induced by the 
experimenter.    
                                                          
5 In a very recent study, Chowdhury et al. (2016) show in a laboratory experiment that groups built on a 
real identity (race) overinvest more strongly than groups with artificial ad-hoc identities. 
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5.6. Appendix A: Written instructions for subjects (translation from 
German) 
General information 
Welcome to our experiment! It is very important that you carefully read and understand 
the following instructions. If you have any questions please raise your hand. We will 
then come to you and answer them. Communication with other participants before and 
during the experiment is prohibited. If you violate this rule, you will have to leave the 
experiment and will not receive any payments. 
In this experiment you can earn money. You will receive 2.50 EUR for your 
participation. You may earn additional money during the experiment. Your income will 
depend on your decisions and decisions of other participants. During the experiment, 
your earnings will be quoted in points. These will be converted into EUR at the end of 
the experiment at the exchange rate of:  
3000 points = 1 EUR. 
The experiment will consist of multiple rounds. Points that you earn in each round will 
be added to your account. Your income in the experiment will be computed as a sum of 
points earned in all rounds of the experiment. Participants will not get information about 
identity or earnings of other participants.  
Course of the experiment 
In today’s experiment, participants are divided into teams of five. Teams are labeled 
with letters (A, B, …). The assignment to teams is conducted randomly before the first 
round begins. The composition of teams is kept fixed for the entire experiment. Within 
a team, each participant is assigned a player number (1 to 5) and this number is also kept 
fixed. 
Information on your team and number assignment will be displayed before the first 
round begins.  
In the experiment, your team will be assigned to an opponent team, with which your 
team will be interacting. Pairs of teams remain the same for the entire experiment. 
Pairing procedure is explained on an example. 
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Example 
In the example team A is assigned to team B. This means that team A will interact with 
team B (see graph) in all rounds of the experiment.  
 
The experiment consists of 20 rounds. All rounds proceed in the same way. 
In each round, your team and the opponent team will compete in a lottery for a prize. 
At the beginning of each round, you receive from us 1000 points. Then, you can decide 
how many points you want to spend on lottery tickets for your team. For one point you 
can buy one ticket (1 point = 1 ticket). You can buy as many tickets as you want, but 
you are not allowed to exceed your budget. Points that you do not spend on lottery tickets 
are added to your account. 
The prize that your team can win in the lottery in each round is 1000 points for each 
team-member (i.e., 5000 in total for the team). 
Your winning chance depends only on how many tickets your team has bought and how 
many the opponent team has. The more tickets your team has bought the more likely it 
is that your team wins. Another way around, the more tickets the opponent team has 
bought, the less likely it is that your team wins. The probabilities with which your team 
wins the prize is equal to the number of tickets of your team divided by the number of 
all tickets bought. This means it is computed according to the following rule: 
Your probability of winning
=  Number of tickets of your teamNumber of tickets of your team +   Number of tickets of the opponent team 
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Your earnings in a round are as follows: 
Your earnings if your team wins = 1000 – your investment in the tickets + 1000 
Your earnings if your team loses = 1000 – your investment in the tickets  
 
If only one team has bought the tickets, it wins with certainty. If neither of teams have 
bought any tickets, the lottery does not take place and nobody wins the prize. 
 
Each round consists of three steps: 
1. In the first step, you decide how many tickets you would like to buy. At the same 
time all other participants from your team and the opponent team make the same 
decision. 
2. In the second step, you get the feedback on the decisions of your team and the 
opponent team. Probabilities of winning are also computed and displayed. All 
tickets bought are numerated. You get the information which numbers correspond 
to tickets of your team and which to tickets of the opponent team. In order to make 
it clearer, this is also displayed graphically. Each ticket is equally likely to be 
drawn. 
3. In the third step, the winning ticket is drawn. The computer draws one of bought 
tickets. The number of the winning ticket and the winning group are displayed on 
the screen. So are your earnings in the current round. 
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Questionnaire (translation from German) 
 
Please report your age: _________ 
Please report your gender: _________ 
Please report your major of studies: _________ 
Please report for how long you have been studying (number of terms): _________ 
 
Please describe briefly how you were deciding on how many tickets to buy. 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Please report your opinion on the following statements: 
In the experiment, I experienced a strong sense of a team spirit.  
(Scale: 1= don’t agree at all, … , 7= totally agree) 
 
My decisions in the experiment were influenced by the fact that we were playing 
against another team.  
(Scale: 1= don’t agree at all, … , 7= totally agree) 
 
In the experiment, it was important to me that my team wins more often that the 
opposite team. 
(Scale: 1= don’t agree at all, … , 7= totally agree) 
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Chapter 6: 
ENVY IN DYNAMIC CONTESTS 
 
Joint work with Uta K. Schier 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Situations of conflict and rent-seeking are as common as trade and cooperation. 
Therefore, contest and rent-seeking behavior has been extensively studied both 
theoretically (see e.g., Congleton et al. 2008a for an overview) and experimentally (for 
a survey, see Sheremeta 2013 and Dechenaux et al. 2015). Most of this research 
considers static set-ups, in which there is only one round of interaction. Yet in many 
situations (e.g., R&D competition, political election, sports) the winner is determined on 
the basis of more than one round. In order to win the prize or obtain the rent, a contestant 
needs to win a certain number of rounds. In theory, such situations are modeled as multi-
battle contests.1 
This paper focuses on incentives to keep participating in the contest despite 
having lost chance of winning and therefore contributes to the research on pervasiveness 
of dynamic contests.2 We consider a setting with two players. Our theoretic analysis and 
a laboratory experiment show that the contestant who has already lost her chance of 
winning the prize may want to stay in the contest, if she displays other-regarding 
preferences and ties in the number of wins are possible. In other words, the underdog 
may not give up, even though he can no longer win the prize. 
                                                          
1 In this paper, we consider a class of multi-battle contests called races. There are, however, also other 
types of dynamic contests, such as elimination contests or the tug-of-war. See Konrad (2009, Chapter 8). 
2 We recognize that whether pervasiveness of contests is desirable or not depends on the circumstances of 
the contest. Without making any claims on that, we investigate the pervasiveness per se.  
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Our analysis complements previous research on pervasiveness of dynamic 
contests. Konrad and Kovenock (2009) study a generic class of multi-battle contests and 
characterize a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The authors show that the contest 
remains pervasive only in the presence of intermediate prizes. Pervasive means at all 
points the contest is non-trivial; none of the competitors gives up in any of the battles. 
Therefore, Konrad and Kovenock (2009, p. 266) argue that “intermediate prizes are 
important to avoid the series of battles becoming rather uninteresting once one of the 
players has accumulated a sufficient advantage that the other player gives up.” The 
statement is very intuitive when applied to sporting events, but is also important in other 
contexts, e.g., patent races. Gelder (2014) extends Konrad and Kovenock's (2009) 
framework by introducing monetary penalties for losing. This means pervasiveness is 
achieved by adding financial incentives. However, these are discounted over time so that 
losing later induces smaller monetary consequences than losing earlier, which allows 
the author to rationalize last stand behavior (i.e., reluctance to surrender).  
Our study provides an alternative explanation for why contests can be pervasive. 
Based on social utility models, we show that disadvantageous inequality aversion (i.e., 
envy) can lead to pervasive contests without intermediate prizes or monetary penalties. 
Social utility models have been extensively studied in the literature and suggest that 
utility not only depends on one’s own monetary payoff but also on others’ payoffs (e.g., 
Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002).  
We consider a framework with two battles, each modeled as a Tullock (1980) 
contest. In order to obtain the prize, one of the two players needs to win both battles. A 
tie in wins (1:1) leads to the prize not being awarded. Such a structure results in a 
straightforward game-theoretic prediction, in which the second battle is trivial, with the 
loser of the first battle (hereafter the “underdog”) surrendering. Envious preferences of 
the players, however, change the theoretic prediction. The second battle is no longer 
trivial, mostly because an envious underdog, left without a chance to win the contest, 
might still invest resources just to harm the other player. This not only influences the 
total dissipation of rents, but might also impact the probability that the prize is awarded.  
In fact, situations in which a tie in wins results in the prize not being awarded are 
frequently observed in markets. For example, blocking (or pre-emptive) patents are an 
increasing threat to many high-tech industries. Consider the prospect of launching a new 
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product that would be innovative in several dimensions. The launching company needs 
to have the patents for all technologies involved. As a result, a company holding a patent 
on one particular (even small) innovation can block other market players from 
commercializing their products (Heller and Eisenberg 1998; Guellec 2012). Such 
situations are often found in sectors of complex technologies, such as software or 
pharmaceuticals. Multiple surveys (Dueget and Kabla 1998; Cohen et al. 2002; Blind et 
al. 2006) suggest that most companies consider defensive blocking an important reason 
for patenting at all.  
We run a laboratory experiment to test predictions from our theoretic analysis 
and find that contestants indeed behave enviously. They are ready to spend considerable 
amounts of their limited resources to prevent their competitor from winning the prize. 
Interestingly, such behavior is not surprising for prospective winners; they expect envy 
and adjust their own investments. Moreover, subjects already anticipate competitive 
behavior in the second battle when investing in the first battle. This means that envy-
driven competition leads to lower investments in the initial round of competition.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 we briefly 
discuss the related literature. Section 6.3 presents our theoretic model and its game-
theoretic analysis under both standard and envious preferences. In Section 6.4 we 
develop an experimental design that allows us to test our theoretic predictions from 
Section 6.3. Finally, we present the experimental results in Section 6.5 and conclude in 
Section 6.6. 
 
6.2. Related literature 
This work contributes to literature on races, which are a type of dynamic 
contests. Harris and Vickers (1985, 1987) opened this theoretic research in the context 
of patent races. They show that under technological uncertainty the leader in a race 
exerts higher efforts than the follower. Moreover, efforts are higher if the gap between 
competitors is small. This research was applied by Klumpp and Polborn (2006) to study 
the dynamics of the US political elections. The authors consider the rationale behind 
sequential (not simultaneous) campaigning in different US states, as a setting of multi-
battle contests. In a more general and context-free approach, Konrad and Kovenock 
(2009) then describe equilibrium behavior in multi-battle (all-pay) contests. This model 
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has recently been extended by Gelder (2014), who introduces monetary penalties for 
losing thereby changing the equilibrium predictions. 
There is little experimental evidence on behavior in dynamic contests. Zizzo 
(2002) is the first to experimentally test Harris and Vickers’ (1987) model and finds only 
limited support for its predictions. More recently, Mago and Sheremeta (2012), as well 
as Irfangolu et al. (2015), compare behavior in sequential and simultaneous multi-battle 
(best-of-three) contests, with battles modeled either as Tullock contests or all-pay 
auctions, respectively. Moreover, Mago et al. (2013) study best-of-three Tullock 
contests and find support for 'strategic' but not 'psychological' momentum. Finally, 
Gelder and Kovenock (2014) examine last stand behavior in best-of-seven contests, 
testing the theoretical predictions of Gelder’s (2014) model, as well as those of the model 
by Konrad and Kovenock (2009). Therefore, their experimental design involves both 
monetary prizes and penalties. In line with Gelder's model, they find that high penalties 
for losing prevent the prospective loser from giving up. No research has so far looked at 
social comparison as a behavioral motive in such settings. Considering that contests 
typically involve interactions between several players, we are interested in how envy 
affects contest behavior.  
Social preferences have already been shown to influence behavior in other 
competitive settings. Besides contests, relevant examples of such environments are 
auctions and tournaments. For instance, Morgan et al. (2003) theoretically study how 
disutility from losing an auction changes equilibrium bidding behavior. The authors 
show that such preferences explain behavior observed in experimental auctions better 
than standard preferences. In particular, they help explain overbidding.3 Kimbrough and 
Reiss (2012) provide experimental evidence on spiteful bidding in second-price 
auctions. The authors show that subjects frequently submit a non-zero bid in order to 
increase the price paid by the competitor. Such behavior could also be explained by 
inequity aversion (i.e., envy). Also tournaments are important contest models in modern 
microeconomics. In tournaments, inequity aversion has also been shown to play a role. 
Grund and Sliwka (2005) game-theoretically analyze behavior in tournaments, assuming 
                                                          
3 Note that Morgan et al. (2003) refer to the modeled deviation from standard preferences as spite. 
Nevertheless, their intuition behind this term corresponds to what we call envy. Both terms are frequently 
used interchangeably in the literature when describing disadvantageous inequity aversion in the mold of 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
 106 
 
6. Envy in Dynamic Contests 
preferences based on the inequity aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and 
demonstrate that inequity aversion drives higher efforts. This result has also been 
confirmed by experimental studies. Balafoutas et al. (2012) test in the laboratory the link 
between social preferences and tournament behavior and show that more spiteful 
subjects react more strongly to the competitive condition. In another experimental study, 
Eisenkopf and Teyssier (2013) provide additional evidence that envy drives higher 
efforts in tournaments. Herrmann and Orzen (2008) investigate spite in Tullock contests. 
Our approach is most similar to their study. However, unlike the authors, who examine 
the impact of other-regarding preferences on bidding in standard (static) Tullock 
contests, we investigate dynamic rent-seeking settings. 
Finally, our theoretic framework and experimental investigation are related to 
the literature on armed conflicts. This literature rests on the canonical model of the 
Tullock (1980) contest, but adapted to peculiarities of military contests (e.g., Hirshleifer 
1989, 1991; Skaperdas 1992; see Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007 for an overview). The 
experimental literature on war behavior is relatively new and limited, but rapidly 
growing. Abbink (2012) surveys experiments on this topic. In this stream of literature, 
our work is related to the recent paper by Lacomba et al. (2014). The authors study how 
post-conflict behavior (e.g., possibility of income destruction) influences conflict 
expenditures and stealing rates. In some experimental treatments, the loser of the conflict 
can lower the winner’s loot by destroying a part (or all) of her own income. While this 
treatment may be similar to our experimental game in expected terms, the settings are 
different in several dimensions. Most importantly, in the experiment by Lacomba et al. 
(2014), the value of the prize is endogenous and results from subjects’ decisions. 
Endogeneity of the prize value (typical for studies on military conflicts) is one of the 
major differences from the set-ups utilized in research on traditional rent-seeking 
contests. 
 
6.3. The theoretical framework 
Previous experiments on dynamic environments of rent-seeking have mostly 
examined best-of-three (or best of 2n+1) contests (Mago and Sheremeta 2012; Mago et 
al. 2013; Irfangoulu et al. 2015). However, in such games one cannot disentangle 
strategically driven behavior from behavior driven by social comparison. In best-of-
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three contexts, the contest only runs as long as of minimum of two contestants have a 
chance of obtaining the rent. Hence, it is not clear to what extent behavior is driven by 
a motive to win the prize or to simply avoid lagging behind. Therefore, we develop a 
new game that allows us to distinguish these motives. 
Moreover, in contrast to Konrad and Kovenock (2009) and Gelder (2014), who 
model battles as all-pay auctions, we define the battles as lottery contests (Tullock 1980). 
In the literature on contest behavior, both approaches are very common, and which 
model is considered more appropriate depends rather on the real-world examples to 
which it is being applied.4 Konrad and Kovenock (2009, p. 258), as well as Gelder (2014, 
p. 444), opt for an all-pay auction model due to analytical convenience. However, for 
testing theoretic predictions in laboratory experiments, a Tullock contest seems to be 
more favorable. Unlike all-pay auctions, where equilibria exist only in mixed strategies 
(Baye et al. 1996), a Tullock contest with two contestants is characterized by a unique 
equilibrium in pure strategies (Perez-Castrillo and Verdier 1992; Szidarovszky and 
Okuguchi 1997).5 Such an equilibrium prediction provides a better behavioral 
benchmark for experimental investigations.  
 
Figure 6.1: Contest structure. 
Note: In parentheses are the numbers of winnings needed to obtain the prize. In the boxes are the prizes 
from the contest. 
                                                          
4 For example, battles have been modeled as lottery contests in previous studies on patent races (Harris 
and Vickers 1987), as well as US presidential nomination campaigns (Klumpp and Polborn 2006). 
5 This holds under the assumption that the parameter r ≤ 2. We use the most standard version of the model, 
with r = 1. See the references for more details. 
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6.3.1. The two-battle contest 
We consider a two-battle contest with two ex-ante symmetric and risk-neutral 
players, each of them initially endowed with E. Let yc and yd denote the total contest 
investments by player A and B, respectively. yc = c, + c, and yd = d, + d,, 
where c,A and d,A describe investments in battle t. There is a single prize V for the 
winner of both battles. In case of a tie in wins (1:1), neither of the players wins the prize 
(see Figure 6.1). Moreover, we assume that if in one of the battles both players make 
zero investments, no player wins the battle and the prize is not awarded.  
Every battle is a rent-seeking contest (Tullock 1980). The probability that player 
A wins battle t is:  
c,A = c,Ac,A + d,A (6.1) 
Hence, her competitor, player B, wins the battle with probability: d,A = 1 − c,A. 
Further, player A’s payoff is as follows:  
 c = ~ − yc +   qp f v sℎ ssqpv − yc        sℎpvp                                       (6.2) 
Player B’s payoff is computed analogously. Both players are informed about the 
outcome of the first battle before the second battle begins.  
 
6.3.2. Equilibrium analysis under standard preferences 
We solve the game by backward induction and find a unique symmetric subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). 
Battle 2 
Assume player A won the first battle. Player B then has no chance of winning 
the overall contest and therefore gives up for the second battle, with an investment of d,∗ = 0. Player A anticipates that her competitor surrenders, invests almost nothing 
(c,∗ → 0j) and wins the second battle and therefore the entire contest.6  
Battle 1 
Ex ante, players are symmetric. Therefore, the expected payoff of player A is:  
NcO =  − c, + c,c, + d,  (6.3) 
                                                          
6 For analytic simplicity, we assume in the consecutive analysis that c,∗ = 0. 
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First order condition yields:  NcOc, = −1 + d,c, + d,  = 0 (6.4) 
Analogously, we can define FOC for player B. In a symmetric equilibrium, both players 
invest:  
c,∗ = d,∗ = 4 (6.5) 
Thus, the payoffs of the winner (player A) and loser (player B) are in equilibrium: 
c =  + 34  ;   d =  − 14       (6.6) 
As such, the game-theoretic prediction for this dynamic contest does not differ 
from the prediction for a conventional Tullock contest. In other words, contestants 
behave in the first battle as if there were only one battle (i.e., a static contest). In the 
equilibrium, 50 percent of the rent is dissipated. 
 
6.3.3. Other-regarding preferences: intuition 
In the next step, we introduce a behavioral extension of the standard analysis. 
Assume that contestants display other-regarding preferences. In particular, assume that 
they are envious (but not compassionate, i.e., display only disadvantageous inequity 
aversion). We adjust the utility function as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999); we assume that 
parameter J ≥ 0 and M = 0.7,8 The utility of player B is therefore now equal to her 
monetary utility and possibly the disutility stemming from the disadvantageous inequity 
aversion:  
Id(c, d) = d − J max -0, c − d8 (6.7) 
We restrict our attention to cases in which J is strictly positive, but not larger than 1 
(0 < J ≤ 1).9  
                                                          
7 Note that the intuition would not change if players were compassionate (M > 0), as long as J ≥ M, which 
is assumed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 822). The “reduced” form of Fehr-Schmidt preferences, 
including only envy (but not compassion), has been applied by Eisenkopf and Teyssier (2013) to derive 
behavioral predictions for their experiment on tournament environments. Moreover, such an approach is 
similar to the one put forward by Bolton (1991). 
8 Moreover, in appendix C we analyze the contest under an evolutionary definition of other-regarding 
preferences. We show that the theoretic predictions are qualitatively very similar and therefore robust 
against a particular modeling approach. 
9 Without a significant loss of generalizability, the assumption makes the analysis more tractable. 
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Let us reconsider the situation of player B in the second battle. We have seen that 
in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under standard preferences, he surrenders and 
his investment in the second battle is 0. We show that if player B is envious, such 
behavior is no longer a part of SPNE. We check incentives for the player to deviate from 
the studied equilibrium by making a small but strictly positive investment in the second 
battle: d, =  > 0. Then, expected utilities are as follows:  
Idd, = 0 =  − 4 − J (6.8) 
Idd, =  > 0 =  − 4 −  − J (6.9) 
It is straightforward to show that expression (6.8) is smaller than (6.9), if  j > n. Therefore, under the assumption of a continuous strategy space, a strictly 
positive value of the envy parameter J always leads to a non-zero investment in the 
second battle. If player A (potential winner) sticks to the SPNE, player B has an 
incentive to invest  in the contest. Player B can almost completely avoid the envy-
related disutility for a very low monetary cost. 
 
6.3.4. Equilibrium analysis under symmetric envious preferences 
We have shown that the SPNE from Section 6.3.2 no longer holds if the underdog 
is envious. In the following, we conduct a more systematic analysis of the role of envy 
in the considered set-up. For simplicity, we assume that the value of the envy parameter J is symmetric and common knowledge.10 Moreover, we restrict our attention to cases 
in which behavior in the first round is symmetric (i.e., symmetric equilibria). 
Investments in the first round in a symmetric SPNE are equal (,∗ = ,∗ ). Therefore, 
investment inequalities can only arise due to asymmetric investment behavior in the 
second battle (,∗ ≠ ,∗ ).11  
We proceed by backward induction to obtain a new subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium prediction. 
 
 
                                                          
10 See Herrmann and Orzen (2008) for a similar approach in conventional Tullock contests. 
11 This means that later on we can replace the condition yc ≥ yd with , ≥ ,. 
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Second battle 
First, we consider the winner of the first battle (player A). Her expected payoff is:  
NIcO = 
 − yc + c,c, + d,  − J d,c, + d, (yc − yd)  yc ≥ yd − yc + c,c, + d,                                         yc < yd
 (6.10) 
Note that player A can experience envy if she loses the second battle and her total 
investment is larger than the investment of her competitor (yc > yd). The first order 
condition, after simplification, is defined by:12  
d, − 2Jd, = c, + d,  yc ≥ yd (6.11a) 
                d, = c, + d,  yc < yd (6.11b) 
Therefore, under the restriction that the investment cannot be negative, the best reply 
function is given by: 
c,d, = max ~0,   d, − 2Jd, − d,  yc ≥ ydmax K0,   d, − d,L                   yc < yd  
 
(6.12) 
Now, we consider the loser of the first battle. The expected payoff function of 
player B is: 
NIdO = 
 − yd − J c,c, + d, ( − yc + yd)                                                        yc ≥ yd − yd − J c,c, + d, ( − yc + yd) −  J d,c, + d, (−yc + yd)  yc < yd
 (6.13) 
The loser experiences envy if the winner gets the prize or/and if his total investment was 
higher than the competitor's investment. The first order condition, after simplification, 
gives:13  
Jc, − 2Jc, = c, + d,   yc ≥ yd (6.14a) 
                Jc, = (1 + J)c, + d,   yc < yd (6.14b) 
Therefore, the best reply function is given by:  
d,c, =

max ~0,   Jc, − 2Jc, − c,            yc ≥ yd
max R0,    J1 + J c, − c,S                   yc < yd
 (6.15) 
                                                          
12 The second order condition for a local maximum is fulfilled if d, < n. 
13 The second order condition is fulfilled as long as c, < n. 
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It can be shown that that c,∗ ≥ d,∗  for all values of 0 < J ≤ 1.14 
The Nash equilibrium of the second stage is determined by the intersection of the 
two well-defined best-reply functions (eq. (6.12) and (6.15)). In order to find a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium, we need to solve a system of two quadratic equations with 
two variables. The system is defined by eq. (6.11a) and (6.14a). 
A non-trivial (unique) solution in which c,, d,>0 exists, but its closed form 
solution cannot be easily derived and is not very useful due to its complexity. However, 
using iterative methods we can find a unique solution for particular values of parameters J and V.15 Figure 6.2 depicts equilibrium investments as a function of J. Moreover, 
examples of equilibrium behavior for several values of the envy parameter are presented 
in Table 6.1. It becomes apparent that as long as J ≤ 1, the underdog's investment 
increases with the strength of inequality aversion (envy), but the winner's investment is 
hyperbolic. The total investment made in the second battle increases with J. 
 
First battle 
With regard to the first battle, recall that contestants are ex ante symmetric. When 
we consider player A, we can re-write the expected winner's and loser's utilities in eq. 
(6.10) and (6.13) as −c, + I and −c, + I, respectively. Thus, we can express 
player A's expected utility as: 
NIcO =  − c, + c,c, + d, I + d,c, + d, I (6.16) 
The first order condition simplifies to:  d,(c, + d,) I − d,c, + d, I = 1 (6.17) 
We can derive an analogous condition for player B, which results in a symmetric 
equilibrium. Hence, equilibrium investments in the first battle are equal to: 
c,∗ = d,∗ = I − I4  (6.18) 
Again, a general algebraic solution is not useful. However, for fixed values of J 
and V we can compute the values I and I and can therefore estimate equilibrium 
                                                          
14 See Proof 1 in Appendix A. 
15 See Klumpp and Polborn (2006) for a similar approach. 
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investments in the first battle (see Table 6.1). Theoretic predictions are graphically 
displayed in Figure 6.2.  
Figure 6.2b reveals that envious players invest significantly more in the contest 
than non-envious players with standard preferences (the standard Nash equilibrium 
prediction). This is due to positive investments in the second battle, which are zero under 
standard preferences. Investments in the first battle decrease when non-zero investments 
in the second battle are anticipated. However, this effect is only marginal. As a 
consequence, rent dissipation in the SPNE increases with envious players. 
 
  
Figure 6.2: Equilibrium behavior under envious preferences (V=80): 
(a) individual investments; (b) total contest expenditures  
Note: Computed in STATA® (using a non-linear equation system). 
 
6.3.5. Efficiency of equilibrium behavior 
Further, behavior induced by envious preferences has important implications for 
the efficiency of the entire contest. Here, we can identify two sources of inefficiency: 
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rent dissipation due to contest investments (direct effect) and the possibility that the prize 
is not being awarded (indirect effect).  
Figure 6.2b shows that the total investment in the contest increases under 
stronger envy parameters J. Moreover, the probability of the prize not being awarded 
also increases with J. Both aspects lead to less efficient contest outcomes. The last two 
columns of Table 6.1 demonstrate this result. For strong envious preferences, the 
expected overall rent dissipation is larger than the prize.16 In comparison to contests with 
standard preferences, where the prize is always awarded and 50 percent of the rent is 
dissipated in the equilibrium, we can conclude that envy can cause tremendous 
efficiency losses in the setting studied.17  
 
 
Table 6.1: Equilibrium behavior (V=80). 
 
 J 
Static contest   Dynamic contest 
 
 
 
Rent  
dissipation 
 
 
 
 Direct rent  
dissipation 
Prob. 
prize  
awarded 
0.00 20.00 50.00%  20.00 0.00 0.00 50.00% 100.00% 
0.10 20.95 52.38%  18.81 5.80 0.50 54.89% 92.12% 
0.25 22.22 55.56%  18.40 10.48 1.96 61.55% 84.26% 
0.30 22.61 56.52%  18.42 11.52 2.51 63.60% 82.12% 
0.50 24.00 60.00%  18.83 14.27 4.89 71.02% 74.49% 
0.65 24.91 62.26%  19.27 15.24 6.91 75.86% 68.81% 
0.75 25.45 63.64%  19.56 15.40 8.44 78.71% 64.60% 
0.90 26.21 65.52%  19.91 14.69 11.18 82.12% 56.80% 
1.00 26.67 66.67%  20.00 13.33 13.33 83.33% 50.00% 
Notes: Computed in STATA® (using a non-linear equation system). Equilibrium behavior for static 
contests under symmetric envious preferences is described by: c,∗ = d,∗ = jj n  (see Herrmann and Orzen 2008, p. 39). 
 
                                                          
16 Denote γ the probability that the prize is awarded. Then, the total dissipation of rent (in expected term) 
is equal to: (1 −  ) + yc + yd. Note that for instance for α=0.75, total dissipation would amount to 
114.1% (compare Table 6.1). 
17 Note that in certain contexts, additional contest investments may not be considered wasteful. For 
instance, when applying the setting to sporting events, a non-trivial second battle can induce social 
benefits. 
c,∗ d,∗c,∗ = d,∗  c,∗ = d,∗  
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6.4. The experiment 
In order to test our theoretic predictions presented in Section 6.3, we ran a 
laboratory experiment. The general structure of the experiment in the main treatment 
follows a set-up of a dynamic contest with two battles. We framed and organized the 
rent-seeking contests as lotteries.  
 
6.4.1. The experimental implementation18 
In the main treatment, two subjects (called A and B) are symmetrically endowed 
with E=80 tokens and compete for a monetary prize of V=80 tokens. Ten tokens 
correspond to 1 EUR. The entire game consists of two battles, neutrally framed for 
subjects as “stages.” Each stage proceeds in three identical steps. First, subjects are 
allowed to purchase lottery tickets, using their individual endowment (one ticket costs 
one token). Subjects make decisions simultaneously. When deciding how many tickets 
to buy, they can use a customized calculator to compute winning probabilities (see 
Figure 6.11 in Appendix D). After subjects have decided on their investment, they 
receive feedback about the investment decision of their opponent and the resulting 
winning probabilities. In the last step, the computer randomly draws one of the tickets 
bought by both players in that stage.19 Whoever bought that ticket is the winner of the 
stage, which is announced for both players on screen. This three-step procedure is 
repeated for the second stage. Payoffs across both stages for each player are equal to: 
 
 = ~80 − vpv  qssp srpsv         p v s 80 − vpv  qssp srpsv + 80       p v  (6.19) 
In our experiment, we investigate one-shot interactions, which are standard for 
studies on social preferences, often involving ultimatum or dictator games. Across all 
treatments, we also elicited beliefs about the behavior of the competitor. This was done 
simultaneously with the investment decision at each stage, and subjects’ estimations 
were incentivized according to a quadratic loss function, capped at 0:  
tv = max -0; 5 − 0.05(pqp − frstq pℎu)} (6.20) 
                                                          
18 For written instructions, see Appendix D. 
19 Analogous to our assumption in Section 6.3, subjects were told that if no tickets are bought by any 
player in a single stage, the lottery does not take place and nobody wins the stage. However, this actually 
never occurred in the main treatment. 
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6.4.2. Treatments 
In our main treatment, called ENVY, subjects play in pairs the game described in 
Section 6.3, under the implementation presented in Section 6.4.1. They compete against 
each other in two consecutive lotteries. Only subjects who win both lotteries are awarded 
a prize.  
Our experiment aims at testing whether envy drives behavior in the second battle. 
However, envy may not be the only reason that losers from the first battle make a 
positive investment in the second battle. Some of the non-zero investments may be due 
to mistakes (Potters et al. 1998) or experimenter demand effect (Zizzo 2010). Moreover, 
subjects may attribute a non-monetary utility to the mere fact of winning the stage, i.e., 
display joy of winning (Sheremeta 2010, 2014), which can drive non-zero investments 
in the second battle. To disentangle envious behavior from these other non-monetary 
motives, we use the tie-breaking rule as a treatment variable.  
In a control treatment, called NOENVY, we implement an alternative tie-breaking 
rule, which stipulates that if there is a tie in wins, the prize is awarded to the winner of 
the first battle. For example, if player A wins the first battle and player B wins the second 
battle, the prize is awarded to player A. Under such a tie-break rule, the first battle is 
decisive for who wins the prize. The first battle loser has no possibility to prevent this. 
Consequently, envy cannot drive behavior in the second battle, which, by contrast, is 
possible in the ENVY treatment. However, even without scope for envy, subjects in the 
NOENVY treatment can still make mistakes or experience joy of winning or demand 
effects in the second stage. Hence, our treatment variation manipulates only the presence 
of envy motives, and it has no impact on motives other than envy. The comparison 
between the NOENVY and the ENVY treatments will reveal the net effect of envy in the 
considered setting.  
Further, we introduced a static contest as another benchmark treatment (STATIC). 
In this treatment, the contest is reduced to a conventional (one-battle) contest. All other 
parameters remain unchanged. This treatment allows us to test whether subjects indeed 
behave as if there were only one relevant round of contest. The experimental treatments 
are summarized in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2: Overview of experimental treatments. 
Treatment Tie-breaking rule Focus 
STATIC n.a. (only one battle) 
Benchmark for as-if 
behavior 
NOENVY 
If 1:1, the first battle winner wins the 
prize 
No envy-driven behavior 
ENVY If 1:1, no one wins the prize Envy effect 
 
6.4.3. Hypotheses 
Based on our theoretic predictions from Section 6.3, we derive four main 
hypotheses for our experiment. The null hypothesis describes behavior of a homo 
oeconomicus player (perfect rationality and selfish preferences), whereas the alternative 
hypotheses specify behavioral players (with bounded rationality and envious 
preferences).  
Following backward induction, we start with behavior in the second stage. Recall 
that a perfectly rational player who maximizes her monetary payoff has no incentive to 
invest in the second battle in the NOENVY treatment because she has already won or lost 
the prize. To understand whether players display any motives other than payoff-
maximization, we formulate Hypothesis 6.1.  
 
Hypothesis 6.1 (Second-stage behavior): Game-theoretic rationality  
H0: In the second stage of the dynamic contest in the NOENVY treatment, both players 
invest 0. 
HA: Both contestants invest more than 0 in the second stage of the contest in the NOENVY 
treatment. 
Moreover, we introduce Hypothesis 6.2 to examine whether envy leads to 
differences in behavior between the ENVY and NOENVY treatments. Remember that 
under selfish preferences, subjects who lost the chance of winning the prize should 
behave the same way in the NOENVY compared to the ENVY condition. 
 
Hypothesis 6.2 (Second-stage behavior): Envy 
H0: Investments of prospective losers in ENVY are as high as those in NOENVY. 
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HA: Investments of prospective losers in ENVY are higher than in NOENVY. 
Furthermore, to investigate whether winners of the first stage anticipate envious 
behavior in the second stage, we compare behavior of the first-stage winner in ENVY 
with the NOENVY treatment. Under selfish preferences of contestants, subjects should 
not expect any investments in the second stage. This also implies that subjects who still 
have a chance of winning the prize (ENVY) behave in the second stage in the same way 
as subjects who have already won the prize (NOENVY). 
 
Hypothesis 6.3 (Second-stage behavior): Anticipation of Envy 
H0: Investments of prospective winners in ENVY are as high as in NOENVY. 
HA: Investments of prospective winners in ENVY are higher than in NOENVY. 
 
Finally, we show in our theoretic analysis that under standard preferences and 
perfect rationality, subjects behave in the first stage as if there were only one stage. Thus, 
our last hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 6.4 (First-stage behavior): Anticipation effect 
H0: Across treatments, investments in the first stage are equal. 
HA: First-stage investments in the static contest are higher than in the dynamic contests. 
 
6.4.4. Experimental procedure 
We conducted a between-subject experiment with three treatments in the 
Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (Germany) in November 2015. The 
experiment was computerized with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), and 212 subjects were 
recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Subjects were undergraduate and graduate 
students from various faculties (66% female, mean age: 23.1) and earned on average 
13.68 EUR (standard deviation 4.44), including a show-up fee of 4 EUR. 
The experimental sessions lasted between 45 – 60 min and always proceeded in 
the same way across all treatments. At the beginning of the experiment, we elicited risk 
preferences of subjects using a menu of incentivized scenarios, in which subjects had to 
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choose between a lottery or a safe option (similar to Holt and Laury 2002).20 After the 
main part of the experiment, one of the scenarios was randomly drawn, played and paid 
out. The results of risk preferences task were revealed to subjects after the main part.  
 
6.5. Results 
In this section, we present results following our main hypotheses. For the 
analyses, we consider one pair of subjects as an independent observation. We collected 
36 independent observations each in the NOENVY and ENVY treatments, and 34 in the 
STATIC treatment.  
 
6.5.1. Behavior in the second battle 
First, we analyze behavior in the second battle to examine Hypothesis 6.1. As 
can be seen in Figure 6.3 subjects on average invest positive amounts in the second 
battle. Specifically, in the treatment NOENVY, both winners and losers on average make 
positive investments (5.4 and 3.5, respectively), implying that non-envy motives 
(mistakes, joy of winning, experimenter demand) play a role for investments in the 
second stage. In both cases, the behavior is significantly different from zero (both 
p<0.001; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, hereafter WSR-test). Winners tend to invest 
slightly more. The difference is, however, not statistically significant: p=0.539 (WSR-
test). This leads to the first result: 
 
Result 6.1: The total effect of mistakes, joy of winning and experimenter demand is non-
negligible. We reject null Hypothesis 6.1. 
Second, our main experimental question concerns the difference in behavior 
between the NOENVY and ENVY treatments. Looking at the ENVY treatment, losers from 
the first stage invest on average 12.4 tokens, which is more than triple the amount we 
observe in the NOENVY treatment. This difference is statistically significant: p=0.011 
(Mann-Whitney U-test, hereafter MWU-test). Similarly, non-zero investments are more 
frequent in the ENVY treatment than in the NOENVY treatment (61% and 36%, 
respectively). This difference is also significant by a -test (p=0.034). The result is also 
                                                          
20 See the experimental screen from z-Tree in Figure 6.10 in Appendix D, as well as the distribution of 
elicited proxy of risk preferences depicted in Figure 6.8 in Appendix B. 
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confirmed in the parametric regression analysis (see column [I] in Table 6.4). The 
treatment dummy is statistically significant in the regression for losers from the first 
battle. They invest on average about 8.5 tokens more in ENVY treatment than in NOENVY 
treatment, which amounts to more than 10 percent of their initial endowment. 
Responses collected in a post-experimental questionnaire provide additional 
evidence that envy is a significant decision-driver. After the experiment, we asked 
subjects to recall how intense their emotions were after they had learned the outcome of 
the first stage. We used an elicitation procedure similar to Bosman and van Winden 
(2002) and Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009), i.e., subjects self-reported their indicated 
emotions on a Likert scale between 1 and 7. Subjects who lost the first battle are in 
general rather reluctant to admit to being envious (the average reported level is 2.9). 
Still, the self-reported level of envy is significantly correlated with the level of 
investment in the second battle (Spearman’s rho 0.350, p=0.039).21 
Zizzo and Oswald (2001) show in their “burning money” experiment that the 
willingness to reduce others’ income depends on the perceived desert of this income 
                                                          
21 Note that the English word “envy” can be translated into German either as “Neid” or as “Missgunst,” 
which correspond to “benign” and “malicious” envy, respectively (see e.g., Smith and Kim 2007). We ask 
subjects to report both. The values reported in the main text describe “Missgunst,” i.e., malicious envy. 
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Figure 6.3: Average investments in the second battle. 
Notes: Asterisks correspond to results of non-parametric tests (WSR-test for the within-
treatment comparison and MWU-test for the between-treatment comparison).  
Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; ns p≥0.1. 
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(i.e., whether someone “earned” the income). We do not find such a regularity in our 
setting. Desert of winning the first battle does not matter for envy-driven behavior in our 
experiment. There is no systematic difference in behavior between losers who lost the 
first battle despite having invested more than their competitor (and who therefore may 
perceive the outcome as unfair) from those who lost after having invested less than the 
competitor. 
These results demonstrate that we can summarize the behavior of losers in the 
second battle as follows: 
 
Result 6.2: Envy substantially increases losers’ investment in the second battle. Players 
are willing to invest significant amounts of money to prevent competitors from winning 
the prize. We reject null Hypothesis 6.2. 
 
Third, we examine whether this envy-driven behavior by losers in the second 
battle is expected by winners from the first battle. In other words, do they adjust their 
investments to counteract envy-driven behavior in the second stage? We indeed find a 
highly significant behavioral adjustment. In the ENVY treatment, winners from the first 
stage increase their average investments in the second battle to 17.3, which is more than 
triple the amount that we observe in the NOENVY treatment (p<0.001, MWU-test). The 
parametric regression analysis arrives at the same conclusion (see column [II] in Table 
6.4). The treatment dummy variable is highly significant. Winners invest on average 
almost 12 tokens more in the ENVY treatment than in the NOENVY treatment, which 
corresponds to 15 percent of the initial endowment. We also find evidence that the 
increase in investments is at least partially driven by the anticipation of envy. The 
average reported beliefs about the underdog’s investment increase from 11.4 in NOENVY 
to 17.6 in ENVY. The difference is not statistically significant (p=0.173, MWU-test). 
Nevertheless, the higher beliefs about underdog’s envy-driven investment drive higher 
investments at least to some extent; these two are significantly correlated (Spearman’s 
rho 0.370, p=0.027). 
 
Result 6.3: In the ENVY treatment, first-battle winners expect envy-driven behavior and 
respond by increasing their investments in the second battle (as compared to NOENVY). 
We reject null Hypothesis 6.3. 
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6.5.2. Behavior in the first battle 
In this section, we analyze behavior in the first battle. As derived in Section 6.3, 
given standard preferences, subjects in dynamic two-battle contests should behave as if 
there were only one battle. We test this prediction by comparing the results from the 
ENVY treatment with results from the NOENVY and the STATIC treatment.  
First, in the ENVY condition, subjects correctly anticipate the non-trivial second 
battle and therefore reduce their investments in the first battle (see Figure 6.4). In 
numbers, the average investment in the ENVY treatment of 19.5 is significantly lower 
than 28.5 in the NOENVY treatment (p<0.01, MWU-test). 
We also observe a weak framing effect between the STATIC and NOENVY 
treatments. Note that in both treatments behavior in the first battle completely 
determines the winner of the entire contest. Nevertheless, framing the contest as a two-
battle game may influence the perception of the prize. Therefore, average investments 
slightly decrease from 35.5 in the STATIC treatment to 28.5 in the NOENVY treatment. 
However, this difference is not statistically significant (p=0.112, MWU-test).  
 
Result 6.4: In the ENVY treatment, subjects anticipate envy and competition in the second 
battle and therefore invest less in the first battle than in the NOENVY treatment. We reject 
null Hypothesis 6.4. 
Figure 6.4: Average investments in the first battle. 
Note: Asterisks correspond to results of a non-parametric MWU-test; 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; ns p≥0.1. 
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 Table 6.3: First battle behavior. Regression analysis. 
Dependent variable: 
Investment 1. battle 
STATIC 
[I] 
STATIC 
[II] 
All 
treatments 
[III] 
All 
treatments 
[IV] 
Belief 
 
0.901*** 
(0.141) 
 
0.737*** 
(0.068) 
1[NOENVY treatment] 
  
-5.680* 
(3.431) 
-0.739 
(2.735) 
1[ENVY treatment] 
  
-16.342*** 
(3.443) 
-5.940** 
(2.873) 
1[Female] 9.409 
(5.937) 
4.339 
(4.650) 
5.074* 
(2.923) 
5.661** 
(2.299) 
Risk preferences (proxy) -1.933 
(1.993) 
-0.655 
(1.552) 
0.421 
(1.085) 
0.560 
(0.853) 
Constant 
  
36.987*** 
(10.175) 
1.702 
(9.592) 
28.746*** 
(5.925) 
1.187 
(5.311) 
Number of observations 62 62 192 192 
R-squared 0.053 0.446 0.119 0.459 
Notes: OLS regressions. In parentheses, standard errors.  
Risk proxy: number of risky choices (integer number between 0 and 10). 
We consider only subjects with consistent risk preferences (i.e., single switching point).  
Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 
Table 6.4: Second battle behavior. Regression analysis. 
Dependent variable: 
Investment 2. battle 
LOSERS 
[I] 
WINNERS 
[II] 
1[ENVY treatment] 8.497** 
(3.417) 
11.889*** 
(2.787) 
1[Female] 3.421 
(3.759) 
2.311 
(2.901) 
Constant 
  
1.287 
(3.387) 
3.941 
(2.705) 
Number of observations 
R-squared 
72 
0.103 
72 
0.215 
Notes: OLS regressions. In parentheses, standard errors. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.   
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6.5.3. Beliefs and behavior in static Tullock contests (STATIC treatment) 
Aside from inter-treatment comparisons and treatment effects, results from the 
STATIC treatment serve as our benchmark for comparing our results to previous 
experimental evidence on Tullock contests, summarized in e.g., Sheremeta (2013). 
Unlike most previous studies that investigate repeated interactions, we report behavior 
in a one-shot experiment. Still, we replicate two major phenomena prominent in the 
literature. First, we find significant overbidding; subjects invest significantly more than 
predicted by the Nash equilibrium under standard preferences (p<0.001, WSR-test). On 
top, the average amount of overbidding in our study (77.6%) is larger than what has been 
reported in many previous studies with repeated contests.22 We also observe 
overspreading; in contrast to the unique equilibrium in pure strategies, subjects 
frequently use the entire strategy space (see Figure 6.6 in Appendix B).  
Since we elicited subjects’ beliefs, we can compare patterns of behavioral 
responses to beliefs in our static game, using the empirical response functions reported 
by Rockenbach and Waligora (see Chapter 2) in a repeated partner settings. Our results 
suggest that reported beliefs and observed behavior are strongly correlated (Spearman’s 
rho 0.624, p<0.001). Figure 6.7 in Appendix B depicts average responses to beliefs in 
the same fashion as presented by Rockenbach and Waligora (see Chapter 2). We find 
the same linear response function, which contrasts starkly to the theoretic prediction of 
best replies. The linearity of the response function is also confirmed by the regression 
analysis in Table 6.3 (see column [II]), which shows a highly significant and strong 
effect of reported beliefs on contest behavior; the estimated parameter amounts to 0.9. 
 
6.5.4. Efficiency of the rent-seeking 
Finally, we investigate how treatment variation influences the efficiency of the 
contests. We aggregate investments made by both contestants during the entire contest. 
The average values are depicted in Figure 6.5a. Across all treatments, we observe very 
strong overbidding as compared to the theoretic prediction under standard preferences. 
Whereas in the symmetric Nash equilibrium only 50% of the rent is dissipated by the 
investments, in all of our treatments subjects dissipated on average more than 80% of 
                                                          
22 For instance, Rockenbach and Waligora (see Chapter 2) report an average overbidding of 29.7% in 
repeated Tullock contests. 
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the prize. However, we do not find any treatment effects on the dissipation of rents (all 
p>0.5, MWU-tests). 
 
Result 6.5: In the ENVY treatment, subjects predict envy-driven competition in the second 
stage and reduce investments in the first stage (as compared to the NOENVY treatment); 
the total dissipation of rents does not increase due to envy.  
 
 This result is probably driven by the fact that subjects in the ENVY treatment 
reduce their investments in the first stage. This reduction is stronger than predicted by 
the theoretic analysis. However, this is in line with experimental evidence from Mago 
and Sheremeta (2012), who test behavior in sequential three-battle contests. The authors 
Figure 6.5: Efficiency of contests across treatments. 
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find that subjects underinvest in the first battle. Although our experimental design differs 
from Mago and Sheremeta’s study in several ways,23 our results qualitatively suggest 
the same behavioral pattern of players being over-cautious at the beginning of the 
contest. 
As pointed out in Section 6.3.5, rent dissipation is only one of two possible 
efficiency concerns in the considered set-up. Envy-driven behavior may also impact the 
likelihood of the prize being awarded. This effect becomes apparent when looking at 
Figure 6.5b. Whereas in the STATIC and NOENVY treatments the prize is always 
awarded, envy-driven investments in the ENVY treatment lead to the prize not being 
awarded in 30 percent of the cases. Depending on the contest, this may lead to a 
significant social loss.  
 
Result 6.6: Due to envy-driven behavior in the ENVY treatment, the prize is not awarded 
in 30 percent of the cases. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
In this paper we provide evidence that envy is a significant and strong driver of 
behavior in dynamic contests and often prevents the prospective loser from surrendering. 
As a consequence, the amount of resources spent in the second battle increases, as 
compared to the theoretic benchmark. Such behavior has an impact on the efficiency of 
the contest. We observe that total dissipation of rents does not increase, as players 
anticipate behavior in the second battle and reduce investments in the first battle more 
than equilibrium behavior would predict. However, we observe another source of 
inefficiencies. We find that envy-driven behavior results in the prize/rent not being 
awarded in 30 percent of the cases.  
This study may provide useful insights in the area of patent protection laws. We 
observe that subjects in our experiment are often determined to prevent the opponent 
from winning the prize. It is not unsound to presume that similar behavior can be 
expected from firms competing against each other in markets. If they also engage in 
fierce patent blocking behavior, this may prevent many products from being 
commercialized and consequently reduce social welfare substantially.   
                                                          
23 Most importantly, Mago and Sheremeta (2012) model battles as all-pay auctions. 
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6.7. Appendix A: Proofs 
 
Proof 1: In the ‘symmetric’ equilibrium, if 0 < J ≤ 1 the second battle investment of 
the prospective winner is not smaller than investment of the prospective loser. 
Since we analyze only equilibria in which first battle behavior is symmetric, yc ≥ yd if 
and only if  c, ≥ d,. Assume now by contrast that c, < d,, which implies that yc < yd. Then, in equilibrium, it must hold from eq. (11b) that d, = (c, + d,). 
Moreover, from eq. (13b) it must hold that Jc, = (1 + J)(c, + d,). From these 
two conditions it follows that d, = j c, as soon as  ≠ 0. However, if 0 < J ≤ 1 
the expression  j < 1, which implies that c, > d,. We obtain a contradiction. ∎ 
 
 
6.8. Appendix B: Additional figures 
 
  Figure 6.6: Distribution of investments in the first stage. 
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Figure 6.7: Average responses to beliefs in treatment STATIC. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Distribution of risk proxy (all three treatments pooled). 
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6.9. Appendix C: Theoretic prediction under relative payoff 
maximization 
 
1. Assumption: 
Player’s expected utility depends on the difference between her own payoff and the 
weighted payoff of the opponent (see Sheremeta 2015a). Player’s utility: 
Idc,  d = d − c 
r is relative payoff parameter (r>0 reflects competitive preferences) 
 
2. Incentive to deviate in the second battle [first battle loser] 
Expected payoffs, assuming the equilibrium behavior of the competitor: 
Idd, = 0 =  − 4 −  ¡ + 34 ¢ = (1 − ) − 4 (1 + 3) 
Idd, =  > 0 =  − 4 −  −  ¡ − 4¢= (1 − ) − 4 (1 − ) −  
Therefore, there is an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium derived under standard 
preferences. 
 
3. Equilibrium prediction under relative payoff maximization 
We apply backward induction and find second-battle equilibrium behavior. Loser’s 
expected payoff in the second battle is: 
NIdO =  − d, − d, − ( − c, − c, + c,c, + d, ) 
First-order condition gives: NIdOd, = −1 +  c,c, + d,  = 0 
Analogously, winner’s expected payoff in the second battle is: 
NIcO =  − c, − c, + c,c, + d,  − ( − d, − d,) 
First order condition gives: 
NIcOc, = −1 + d,c, + d,  = 0 
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Combining the two first-order conditions, we obtain that: 
c, = d, 
Inserting this in the first-order conditions and solving for optimal investment levels gives 
us the equilibrium prediction for the second battle: 
 Loser:  c,∗ = F(jF)£  
 Winner: :  d,∗ = F£(jF)£  
By backward induction, we can find symmetric first battle behavior: 
c,∗ = d,∗ = I − I4  
where  I =  + n(jF)£; I =  − F£n(jF)£ 
Using the derived predictions, we can depict equilibrium behavior as a function of 
parameter r (see Figure 6.9). 
Figure 6.9: Equilibrium prediction under relative payoff maximization (V=80).  
(a) individual investments; (b) total contest expenditures. 
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6.10. Appendix D: Computer screens and experimental instructions 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Computer mask in the risk elicitation task. Translation from German. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Computer mask at the decision stage (treatments ENVY & NOENVY). Translation 
from German.  
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Experimental written instructions: ENVY-treatment (translation from 
German) 
 
General information 
Welcome to our experiment! It is very important that you carefully read and understand 
the following instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will 
then come to you and answer them. Communication with other participants before and 
during the experiment is not allowed. If you violate this rule, you will have to leave the 
experiment and will receive no payment. 
You can earn money in this experiment. You will receive 4 EUR for participation. You 
can earn additional money during the experiment. The amount you earn depends on your 
and other participants’ decisions during the experiment. You will be paid in cash at the 
end of the experiment. Your payoff or identity will not be revealed to other participants. 
Today’s session consists of two independent experiments that we call Part 1 and Part 2. 
Your earnings in both will be added up. 
 
Part 1 
In Part 1 you will make a number of decisions, for which you can earn money. How 
much you will earn depends partially on your decisions and partially on luck. 
In a moment, you will see a menu of ten scenarios. In each scenario, there is an Option 
A and an Option B. Please decide which option you prefer.  
After you have made all of your decisions, one of the scenarios will be randomly chosen 
and played out. The corresponding amount of money you earned will be added to your 
payment account. 
Option A is the same in all scenarios. This is a lottery that gives you 2 EUR with 50% 
probability and 0 EUR with 50 % probability. 
Option B differs across scenarios. This is an amount of money you can get with 
certainty (i.e., 100% probability). 
Which scenario was chosen and played out will be revealed to you after you have 
finished Part 2 of today’s experiment. 
<SCREEN 1: see Figure 6.10> 
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Part 2 
Your earnings in this part are denoted in tokens. These will be converted into EUR and 
added to your account. The exchange rate is: 
10 tokens = 1 EUR 
In this part of the experiment you will interact with another participant. You will be 
randomly matched with an opponent in a minute. In each pair, there will be player A 
(marked blue) and player B (marked red). These roles will be assigned randomly. 
Information on whether you are player A or player B will appear on the screen before 
the game begins. 
You and your opponent will compete in a two-stage game for a prize. Each stage is a 
lottery. Both stages (i.e., lotteries) proceed in the same way. Only the player who wins 
both stages wins the prize of 80 tokens. 
For the entire game, you have an endowment of 80 tokens. 
In each stage, you decide on how many points you want to spend on lottery tickets. One 
ticket costs 1 token (1 token = 1 ticket). You can purchase as many tickets as you wish. 
However, you are not allowed to exceed your budget of 80 tokens. In stage 2, you can 
only use tokens you have not spent in stage 1. The tokens you did not spend in either 
stage are added to your account. 
Your probability of winning in a particular stage depends on how many tickets you have 
bought in this stage and how many your opponent has bought. The more tickets you 
bought, the more likely it is that you win the stage. Similarly, the more tickets your 
opponent bought, the less likely it is that you win the stage. The probability that you will 
win the stage is equal to the number of your tickets divided by the number of all tickets 
bought. This means in each stage the probability of winning is computed as follows: 
Your probability of winning =  Number of your ticketsNumber of your tickets +   Number of tickets of the opponent 
If only one player has bought tickets, she/he wins the stage with certainty. If neither of 
the players bought any tickets, the lottery does not take place and nobody wins the prize. 
The prize of 80 tokens is awarded only to the player who wins both stages. 
Your earnings are as follows: 
Your earnings if you win the prize = 80 – your investment in tickets in both stages + 80 
Your earnings if you lose = 80 – your investment in tickets in both stages 
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Each stage consists of three steps: 
Step 1 
In the first step, you decide how many tickets you would like to purchase. At the same 
time your opponent makes the same decision. 
While you make your decision, you can use a what-if-calculator. You can insert 
hypothetical investments for your opponent and yourself, and the calculator computes 
the probabilities of winning for you and your opponent, according to the formula above. 
You can use the calculator as often as you want. Please just insert in the red field (see 
red field (1) in Figure 1) the opponent’s investment and click on “Compute.” 
You should insert your final decision in the field on the right-hand side of the screen and 
confirm with the button “OK” (see red field (2) in Figure 1). You are not only asked 
about your investment, but also about what investment you expect from your opponent. 
For this, you can earn a bonus of up to 5 tokens. The amount of the bonus depends on 
how accurate your prediction is. The smaller the deviation of your prediction, the higher 
your bonus is. The bonus is computed in the following way. 
Bonus = 5 − 0.05 ∗ Deviation 
The deviation is the difference between your prediction and the actual opponent’s 
investment: 
Deviation = |Your prediction − actual opponentbs investment| 
It is not important that you understand the formula well. In general, it holds that the 
better you guess the behavior of the opponent, the higher your bonus is. If the mistake 
is larger than 10, the bonus is 0. This means there is no negative bonus; you cannot lose 
any tokens for your prediction. Your bonuses from both stages will be added to your 
account. 
 
Step 2 
In the second step, you get feedback on your opponent’s decision (how many tickets 
she/he has bought). Probabilities of winning are also computed and displayed. All tickets 
bought are numbered. You get information on which numbers correspond to your tickets 
and which to tickets of your opponent. In order to make it clearer, this is also displayed 
graphically.  
Each ticket is equally likely to be drawn. 
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You also receive feedback on how accurate your prediction about the opponent’s 
investment was and how large your bonus is. 
 
Step 3 
In the last step, the winning ticket is drawn. The computer draws one of the tickets that 
were purchased. The number of the winning ticket and the winner are displayed on the 
screen.  
To sum up, the game goes as follows: 
 
 
Before the game starts, we would like you to answer three test questions in order to make 
sure that you have understood the rules. They appear on the screen as first. 
 
Figure 6.12: Figure 1 from the written instructions. Translation from German. 
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